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**Lecture, Symposium, etc.**

International Pre-G20 Summit Joint Workshop on  
“The G20-UN Relationship:  
Working Together for a Secure, Sustainable World”  
by the G20 Research Group, the University of Toronto,  
and the Integrated Center for UN and Foreign Affairs Studies,  
Kwansei Gakuin University, held on June 23, 2019  
at Kwansei Gakuin University in Nishinomiya, Japan

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### **Overview**

The purpose of this joint workshop held on June 23, 2019, five days before the G20 summit in Osaka scheduled for June 28-29, was to examine the possibility of building a partnership between the G20 and the United Nations that had not been discussed so far. It was a discussion between the researchers of the G20 Research Group of the University of Toronto and those of the Integrated Center for UN and Foreign Affairs Studies at Kwansei Gakuin University. This proposal came to Kwansei Gakuin University from Professor John Kirton of the University of Toronto, who has been conducting research on the G20 for many years. Thus, the joint workshop was held by the University of Toronto and Kwansei Gakuin University, which is trying to nurture human resources working in the United Nations in the future.

The G20 (Group of 20 major countries) is a symbol of post-G7 multilateral diplomacy. Beyond traditional financial, economic and development issues, nowadays, it is a summit with processes for advanced and newly emerging countries dealing with a wide range of issues, such as climate change, infectious diseases,

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energy, environment and gender.

Since the start of the G20 summit in 2008, it has worked with the UN by inviting the UN Secretary General to participate in every G20 summit and by supporting the key sustainable development priorities of the UN. However, as the UN approaches the second five-year period to advance its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) launched in September 2015 and addresses critical urgent global challenges such as implementing and improving the Paris Agreement on climate change, there is now the need for a stronger synergistic G20-UN partnership.

This international joint workshop addressed the following key questions: How has the G20 summit worked to advance the SDGs to build a safe, secure, and sustainable world? What will and can it do at the Osaka Summit to advance these goals? How has it worked with the UN in this regard? How will and can it strengthen this G20-UN partnership at the Osaka Summit and in the coming years?

The United Nations and the G20 are systems with very different purposes and structures. The United Nations is a collective security system aimed at maintaining international peace and security, and an international organization that promotes international cooperation on development and human rights issues. On the other hand, the G20 is an intergovernmental process with 19 country members plus the European Union, including advanced economies, emerging and developing countries with large populations and economies, and is a multilateral forum for discussing economic, trade, financial, and developmental cooperation. Presently, the G20 and the United Nations often work on common issues in many fields; however, they have different stakeholders and actors. Therefore, it is not easy to build a structural synergy between them.

The SDGs address socio-economic developmental issues common to both developed and developing countries. They are like a 21st-century economic and social charter that complements the UN Charter across human and socio-economic development as well as planetary environment domains. Therefore, an attempt to strengthen the partnership between the G20 and the UN through the SDGs is a sensible motivation.

The G20 is an intergovernmental process built, whatever form it might be, on capitalism and the market economy. However, capitalism has reached its limits due to the inherent problems of alienation caused by profit maximizing and effectiveness-oriented behavior, and the widening gap between rich and poor through globalization. How is the G20 responding to the needs of the world, and how will it shift to a new paradigm of post-global capitalism? For decades, the United Nations has been trying to achieve peace, development, and human rights with freedom from fear and freedom from want. It aims at promoting social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and in the many smaller and less-developed

countries that are not members of the G20. It is a grand effort to aim for. There is a widening gap between the G20 and the United Nations regarding to whom they must be held accountable.

At the G20, leaders seldom listen to the voices of vulnerable developing countries or the poorest countries. Whether the host countries of the G20 so far have prioritized listening to the voices of the poorest countries must be reviewed. Thus, the lack of accountability in this regard is a challenge for the G20. However, the United Nations exists as an organization that reflects the views of all its member countries equally, whether the countries are big or small.

Considering this underlying difference, the mission of this workshop was to explore if and how the G20 and the United Nations can work together. In the discussions at the workshop, it was asked whether there was a common standard for measuring the progress of the SDGs promoted by both the G20 and the United Nations, and whether gross domestic product (GDP) is a panacea to measure the progress and achievement of the SDGs. There may be different criteria to replace or complement GDP. The common happiness index (Gross National Happiness, or GNH) or an indicator that emphasizes the environment, for example, could be considered as supplementary standards. It was also pointed out that capacity building for preparing credible statistics in many developing countries was necessary as a basis for development.

The G20 does not focus on military spending control, agricultural or gender issues in their totality. For example, at previous G20 meetings the issues of women's empowerment and gender equality have been discussed; however, LGBTQ issues were not part of the discussion. In addition, there are almost no discussions of culture, religion, and population control. It is undeniable that the G20 has many limitations. For overcoming such differences between the G20 and the United Nations, the G20 Osaka Summit will look rather less promising as to whether concrete steps can be taken to build a partnership by using the SDGs as a parameter.

However, we should not stop at this. Although there are differences in the purpose and composition of the G20 and the United Nations, efforts to establish a partnership that can garner cooperation in attaining the SDGs must continue. These efforts will include discussions on standards for measuring progress, policy, and information sharing as well as the development of statistics and other databases. There was a largely held perception, if not a consensus, that there is a need to do this.

As a specific opportunity, major issues of the G20 such as SDGs, climate change and universal health coverage can be discussed at the High-Level Meetings of the UN General Assembly scheduled in New York in September this year. Japan,

which holds the G20 presidency, reports on the issues discussed at the G20 Osaka Summit at this forum, and there could be a possibility for building a cooperative relationship by encouraging follow-up at the United Nations.

It will be difficult for the G20 and the United Nations to establish a new organizational and structural collaboration. However, as entities addressing the SDGs and human security, they are mutually complementary and reinforcing by sharing information and policies at such high-level settings. As a conclusion of this workshop, it can be said that this existing opportunity must be utilized fully now and in the future to nurture a culture of partnership between the mighty process of the G20 and the universal organization of the UN.

### **Opening**

The workshop opened with Prof. Osamu Murata, President of KGU, giving welcome remarks to the participants and audience, followed by opening remarks by Prof. Takahiro Shinyo, Dean of the Integrated Center for UN and Foreign Affairs Studies of KGU.


### **G20 Summit Performance, 2008-2018**

Prof. Jonathan Luckhurst, associate professor of International Relations at Soka University, Tokyo presented this session. His research focuses on the G20 and global economic governance, and he has participated in the G20's Think 20. His research focuses primarily on monitoring the summits' effectiveness and the development process of the summits over the years.

At beginning of the presentation, Prof. Luckhurst asked, "how important is the G20 today," concerning the significance of the G20 and whether it retains its significance still after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09. In addition, he asked "how well does the G20 perform in making summit commitments and how well do the members follow through on their commitments?"

With all the involved states, Prof. Luckhurst said that the G20 has a lot of potential influence and leverage on the global economy. The members account for 85% of global economic output, making summits very important (See Luckhurst 1). In analyzing past summits, he argued that the 2009 London Summit was the most crucial summit because the G20 prevented the global economy from dipping into a deeper and more prolonged recession. According to Prof. Luckhurst, it is debated whether the G20 has transitioned from a crisis committee into a steering committee over the years, especially with its mixed performance at the 2010 Toronto Summit. However, the Seoul Summit at the end of 2010 reinvigorated the G20, consolidating

### Additional Materials Luckhurst 1



its post-crisis role, especially in expanding the agenda to include the SDGs.

Prof. Luckhurst added that the new changes brought to the G20 “indicates a kind of decentralized authority in the context of global economic governance”. He also pointed out that the “Christmas tree effect” of the host adding on different agendas for every summit began at Seoul. Although this practice has been viewed negatively by some, he argued that this is actually good, and the broader issues brought forth are legitimate concerns and worth working on. He believes the G20 should cooperate on many issues, with broadened agendas instead of focusing primarily on narrow goals. Prof. Luckhurst continued by covering the agendas worked on at each post-crisis summit (See Luckhurst 2).

He said that the 2015 Antalya Summit brought a new focus on implementation, and believes this to be a very important development as it has been brought into question over the years how and exactly what has been implemented through the G20. The refugee crisis was a major issue during the same year, and it was at this time that the engagement forums joined together and proposed a joint statement that the G20 should act on and hold some position on the issue. He said that civil society engagement and the attempts to influence the G20 were positive developments for this summit.

Regarding the 2019 Osaka Summit, Prof. Luckhurst voiced concern that the trade wars could overshadow the summit and its other agendas. However, he said

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### 5. Post-crisis summit performance: Pittsburgh 2009-present

- Pittsburgh Summit, Sept. 2009 – ambitious “**Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth**” & commitment to **phase-out fossil fuel subsidies**; plus **IMF vote-quota reform** & leaders’ declaration: “G-20 to be the **premier forum** for our international economic cooperation”
- Toronto Summit, June 2010 – **outbreak of Eurozone crisis & contradictory fiscal policies** (fiscal stimulus backed by USA & China, EU shift to austerity); violent **street protests**
- Seoul Summit, Nov. 2010 – this was a key summit, arguably second most important after London; **consolidated G20 post-GFC role**; **endorsed Basel III Accords, expanded agenda** to include **development**; symbolic importance of **decentralizing authority**

### 6. Post-crisis summit performance: Pittsburgh 2009-present, cont’d...

- Cannes Summit, Nov. 2011 – switch to **annual presidencies**; **Eurozone & Greek crisis** dominated; **French agenda marginalized** on monetary system reform (eg. USS vs SDRs, RMB role), financial regulation, FTI. **G20 troika system** established & rotating presidency groups due by 2016
- Los Cabos Summit, June 2012 – focus on **development** issues, introducing **food security**, supported by CSOs (Oxfam); **T20 & Y20 added** to B20 & L20; **foreign ministerial**; agreement on **extra financing for IMF, including from developing states**; symbolism of **developing state G20 Chair**
- St. Petersburg Summit, Sept. 2013 – G20 **protectionism “standstill commitment”** until 2016; endorsed **OECD BEPS agenda**; **agenda expanded**, new focus on employment, investment financing, sovereign debt, inequality; **C20 formalized**; **Syria crisis**, foreign & labor-finance ministerials

### 7. Post-crisis summit performance: Pittsburgh 2009-present, cont’d...

- Brisbane Summit, Nov. 2014 – PM Abbott **tried to reduce agenda**, couldn’t exclude **climate** (agreed substantive 2015 Paris deal); **Abbott met B20, not L20**; **Malaysian Airlines Flight 17**; **Brisbane growth target** (+2% by 2018); “**25 by 25**” female labor target; **Global Infrastructure Hub** in Sydney
- Antalya Summit, Nov. 2015 – **inclusiveness, implementation, & investment** for growth; **security, development, climate** focus, while Turks noted “**legitimacy**” of broader agenda; **G20 refugee crisis** statement, **joint statement from engagement forums**; Paris/Ankara attacks & **anti-terrorism pledge**
- Hangzhou Summit, Sept. 2016 – **trade, investment, innovation** focus; pessimism about **persistent low global growth** (Brexit); “**Hangzhou Consensus**” on **monetary, fiscal, & structural** policies to achieve sustainable & inclusive growth; China-U.S. announced adoption **Paris Climate Agreement**

### 8. Post-crisis summit performance: Pittsburgh 2009-present, cont’d...

- Hamburg Summit, July 2017 – **G19 (-USA) clause on Paris climate agreement**; **anti-protectionism** with addition of “**free and fair trade**” (Trump); German Presidency’s “**compact with Africa**” to encourage investment; **difficult political context** (Trump, Brexit, populism), violent **street protests**
- Buenos Aires Summit, Nov. 2018 – **trade** focus, Pres. Macri on future **reform to WTO dispute-resolution system**; China-U.S. sideline bilateral led to **mutual halt to increasing tariffs**; digitalization & future of work, **gender economic equity**, healthcare, infrastructure, **SDGs, climate ‘G19’**
- Osaka Summit, June 2019 – G20 Fin. Min., Fukuoka “**Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment**”; trade key, **WTO reform** overshadowed by **Trump ‘trade wars’**(?); Fukuoka on aiming for **tax agreement on giant tech firms** by 2020; **Mexico’s AMLO** won’t attend; **women’s empowerment**

that the aim for an agreement on taxing giant tech firms was important. The focus on women’s empowerment was also very welcome, and he suggested that the engagement groups and their joint statements on gender economic equity issues influenced the inclusion.

Prof. Luckhurst concluded his presentation with the following statement:

“If we talk about G20 cooperation I think it was crucial on issues like macro-prudential financial regulation and on sustainable development. Since the

financial crisis, G20 cooperation has been sometimes undermined by political differences. In recent years, perhaps increasingly linked to populist politics, especially on issues like trade . . . despite some challenges to multilateral cooperation, I think the G20 continues to be an actual and indeed potential source of cooperation in a very difficult period for the world economy and the world in general.”

### **Putting Promises into Practice: Members’ Compliance with G20 Commitments**

Brittaney Warren, Director of Compliance, and Ji Yoon Han, Co-Chair of Summit Studies, G20 Research Group, presented at this session.

Ms. Warren started by presenting the G20 compliance performance from 2008 to 2017. Since G20 leaders began meeting, they have made over 2500 commitments across various policy areas or subjects. Most of the commitments made are on macroeconomic policy, with 467, and financial regulation, with 340. The agenda has since expanded, including to priorities of the global south countries on development, and issues regarding jobs, trade, energy, climate change, gender equality, health, and the digital economy. According to Ms. Warren, “commitments are important because these elevate important global issues onto the highest political agenda.”

The commitments made are important and matter to almost everyone. However, commitments that are not followed through have no value. The usefulness of the G20 has been questioned by many, saying that it is wasting money, and that it does not deal with global issues adequately. According to Ms. Warren, the G20 Research Group has found that G20 members do comply with their commitments. The Research Group and its partners have assessed 255 commitments made since 2008, with overall compliance at 71%. She believes the score has room for improvement. Although the score has risen over time, it has been at a slow pace and miniscule when today’s global challenges are considered.

The 2017 Hamburg Summit reached a peak compliance score of 80%, despite the US having the second lowest member compliance with the commitments made there. According to Ms. Warren, this shows that the G20 is largely a collaborative effort and is not dependent on any one power. She proceeded to present the average compliance scores of each member.

She said that not surprisingly, the G20 complies better with core economic commitments than socially focused commitments. The subjects of tax at 85%, macroeconomic policy at 80%, financial regulation at 78%, and jobs at 75% are all above the overall average.

Regarding the Osaka Summit, the three core priorities were the digital revolution, climate change and international trade with a focus on digital trade.

Traditionally, G20 compliance has been low on all of these issues as they are hard to govern. Climate change requires an ambitious approach, not incremental policy action, while trade and data governance have few existing global rules and are being resisted by emerging economies of the G20. More discussion on these issues and taking advantage of accountability measures, such as referencing the UN climate body in a commitment, is needed to shine a spotlight on these traditionally low-compliance subjects, she says.

Next, to take the podium was Ms. Han, who began her presentation by describing the G20 Research Group. The group is a global network of scholars, students, professionals, academics, and business and non-governmental communities who follow the work of the G20 leaders, finance ministers and central bank governors, and other G20 institutions. The group is directed from and is based at Trinity College and the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto. The team comprises over a hundred researchers and operates globally with offices abroad. The G20 Research Group's mission is to serve as the world's leading independent source of information and analysis on the G20, aiming to accurately describe, explain, and interpret what the G20 is and what its members do, and to foster transparency and accountability in G20 governance. This is done through the annual compliance report, which includes assessments on the G20 members' summit commitments.

On how compliance is measured, Ms. Han said the group employs a methodology of assessing compliance by analyzing the leaders' declaration and other documentation issued at each summit. The Research Group selects a priority set of 20 commitments made by the leaders with criteria such as "representation of the core agenda" and creates a report. Each report has three components: a history of the commitment's inclusion as well as how it has evolved over the years, a commitment feature that guides the analyst on how to include or exclude the actions members have taken, and a scoring mechanism that assesses members' performance as non-compliant (-1), partially compliant (0) and fully compliant (+1). She said that all research is conducted using publicly available data, which encourages transparency and accountability so that observers can verify the information themselves (See Jiyoan 1).

Ms. Han said the overall compliance score of the Buenos Aires cycle across 20 commitments was 77%, as of June 2019, which was higher than the historical average of 71%. She said a major factor for this was that many of the commitments were continuations from previous summits, with the potential benefit of projects already being in place to work on. In terms of compliance by member, the EU had compliance of 100% (See Jiyoan 2).

With a compliance rate of 93%, universal health coverage was the commitment

**Jiyoon 1 2018 G20 Buenos Aires Summit Final Compliance Scores—All**

		Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	France	Germany	India	Indonesia	Italy	Japan	Korea	Mexico	Russia	Saudi Arabia	South Africa	Turkey	United Kingdom	United States	European Union	Average	
1	Climate Change: Disaster Resilience	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	+1	+1	+1	+0.35	68%
2	Development : Early Childhood Development	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	0	0	+1	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	+0.45	73%
3	Digital Economy: Data Governance	0	+1	0	0	+1	0	0	-1	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	-1	-1	0	0	-1	+1	+0.05	53%
4	Employment : Skills Development	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	-1	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	+0.40	70%
5	Energy: Cleaner, Flexible and Transparent Systems	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	-1	+1	+0.75	88%
6	Financial Regulation : Tax Administration	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+0.45	73%
7	Food Security: Malnutrition	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+0.75	88%
8	Gender: Economic Empowerment	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+0.65	83%
9	IFI Reform: IMF	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	-1	-1	+1	0	+1	0	0	0	0	-1	+1	+1	+0.30	65%
10	Macroeconomics: Inclusive Growth	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.65	83%
11	Climate Change: Paris Agreement	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	n/a	+1	+0.74	87%
12	Digital Economy: Digital Infrastructure	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+0.80	90%
13	Employment: Future of Work	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	0	0	+1	0	+1	+0.65	83%
14	Energy: Energy Security	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+0.80	90%
15	Financial Regulation : Technology	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	+1	-0.05	48%
16	Financial Regulation : International Taxation	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	-1	0	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	+0.55	78%
17	Food and Agriculture: Sustainable Agriculture	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	0	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+0.55	78%
18	Health: UHC	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.85	93%
19	Infrastructure: Infrastructure Investment	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	+0.60	80%
20	Trade: WTO Reform	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	-1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.60	80%
	Average	+0.75	+0.80	+0.70	+0.75	+0.75	+0.65	+0.70	+0.45	+0.40	+0.50	+0.60	+0.60	+0.35	+0.45	+0.10	+0.05	+0.25	+0.60	+0.42	+1.00	+0.54	77%
		88%	90%	85%	88%	88%	83%	85%	73%	70%	75%	80%	80%	68%	73%	55%	53%	63%	80%	71%	100%	77%	

Note: IFI = international financial institution; IMF = International Monetary Fund; UHC = universal health coverage; WTO = World Trade Organization.

with the highest rate of compliance. Ms. Han said it is likely this is due to many members having health coverage as a top priority already (See Jiyoon 3). Following that was digital infrastructure and energy security commitments with 90% compliance, and finally the cleaner, flexible, and transparent systems and malnutrition commitments tied for third place at 88% compliance. Financial regulation of technology was last with 48% compliance. She said the weaker compliance for this and data governance could be a point of concern for the Osaka Summit as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe prepares to launch the Osaka Track.

Regarding the Osaka Summit and Prime Minister Abe's agenda, Ms. Han said there is a mixed bag in areas such as the digital economy. The G20 members

**Jiyoon 2 2018 G20 Buenos Aires Summit Final Compliance by Member—All**

Rank	Member	Average	
1	European Union	+ 1.00	100%
2	Australia	+ 0.80	90%
3	Argentina	+ 0.75	88%
	Canada		
	China		
6	Brazil	+ 0.70	85%
	Germany		
8	France	+ 0.65	83%
9	Japan	+ 0.60	80%
	Korea		
	United Kingdom		
12	Italy	+ 0.50	75%
13	India	+ 0.45	73%
	Russia		
15	United States	+ 0.42	71%
16	Indonesia	+ 0.40	70%
17	Mexico	+ 0.35	68%
18	Turkey	+ 0.25	63%
19	Saudi Arabia	+ 0.10	55%
20	South Africa	+ 0.05	53%

perform well on digital infrastructure, but poorly on data governance. She said that Prime Minister Abe could enjoy moderate success in launching the Osaka Track. Looking at the priority agenda, she said the data for reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) suggests that members are open to dialogue; however, there were indications that trade was a very contentious topic in the background. She said that the robust anti-protectionist language that has been historically strong with trade commitments has been watered down through the recent summits with President Donald Trump coming on the G20 landscape and US-China trade war issues arising. The trade war would have a large impact on both the world economy and the tone of the summit on trade.

The climate change – related commitments on the Paris Agreement and disaster resilience were ranked sixth and seventeenth respectively (See Jiyoon 3). She said this suggested Prime Minister Abe will have to work to generate momentum and political will on these issues. The US was a factor here, as the president questions the truth of climate change, preventing consensus on climate change action.

In conclusion, Ms. Han said, “Japan goes into the Osaka Summit with some

**Jiyoon 3 2018 G20 Buenos Aires Summit Final Compliance by Commitment—All**

Rank	Commitment	Average	
1	Health: Universal Health Coverage	+ 0.85	93%
2	Digital Economy: Digital Infrastructure	+ 0.80	90%
	Energy: Energy Security		
4	Energy: Cleaner, Flexible and Transparent Systems	+ 0.75	88%
	Food Security: Malnutrition		
6	Climate Change: Paris Agreement	+ 0.74	87%
7	Employment: Future of Work	+ 0.65	83%
	Gender: Economic Empowerment		
	Macroeconomics: Inclusive Growth		
10	Infrastructure: Infrastructure Investment	+ 0.60	80%
	Trade: Reform of the World Trade Organization		
12	Financial Regulation: International Taxation	+ 0.50	78%
	Food and Agriculture: Sustainable Agriculture		
14	Development: Early Childhood Development	+ 0.45	73%
	Financial Regulation: Tax Administration		
16	Employment: Skills Development	+ 0.40	70%
17	Climate Change: Disaster Resilience	+ 0.35	68%
18	International Financial Institution Reform: International Monetary Fund	+ 0.30	65%
19	Digital Economy: Data Governance	+ 0.05	53%
20	Financial Regulation: Technology	-0.05	48%

encouraging results and some points of concern. Japan must consider how to persuade a distracted hegemon to participate, and must contend with the worrying trend away from multilateralism and to protectionist actions. It must take into account the numerous geo-political tensions like the trade war, Brexit and the increasingly hostile situation in Iran. However, Japan is a strong host in a way that Argentina was not: it is a practised participant of global governance bodies such as the G7; it is a signatory to a number of important trade deals including with Canada such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership; and it has the connections and influence necessary to create a summit of success.”

### **The G20 and UN’s Role in Asian and Global Security**

Prof. David A. Welch, University Research Chair and Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, presented on the G20 and UN’s role on Asian and global governance. He specifically covered conflicts and security issues

in South East Asia.

First, Prof. Welch presented a chart displaying the number of global conflicts post-World War II until the present, showing how conflicts have changed over the period (See Welch 1). He pointed out how there was an increase in global conflict during the Cold War, while those numbers have declined in recent years, especially with interstate conflicts, and by far the most conflicts are intrastate. Then, he presented a chart with conflicts by region (See Welch 2), intensity (See Welch 3), battle-related deaths by the millions (See Welch 4) and duration trends by type of conflict (See Welch 5). He said the data shows trends that the world is becoming relatively more peaceful. According to Prof. Welch, despite that, there is still concern for the potential of interstate conflict in the world, and that modern interstate conflicts involving nuclear-armed nations could end civilization.

Prof. Welch considered four flashpoints in East Asia as the most dangerous flashpoints: the Korean peninsula, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. With the US and China on either side of the issue in all four of these flashpoints, they pose the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Prof. Welch thinks that if a catastrophic interstate conflict were to break out, it would be at one of these four places. However, he said that all four are not equally dangerous, and no one perceives accurately which one is truly dangerous.

Prof. Welch argued that the situations in the East China Sea and South China Sea do not involve unmanageable conflicts of interest, and are instead driven by misperception and misjudgment, issues that could be cleared up. According to him, situations with entrenched conflicts of interest are much more difficult to defuse.

Prof. Welch said that the East China Sea situation is less dangerous than is perceived. He presented data on the number of scrambles of the Japanese air self-defense force over the years intercepting Chinese aircraft that have encroached upon Japanese airspace over the Senkaku Islands (See Welch 6). The number of fighter deployments has increased drastically since 2012, when Japan nationalized the islands. Lately though, he said that with fewer planes being deployed, China is trying to de-escalate the situation in the East China Sea. He argued that the reason for the de-escalation was that China understands she does not have a strong legal claim to the Senkaku Islands, and that China realized the socio-economic importance of Japan to China, and keeping good relations benefits China more.

Regarding the South China Sea dispute, Prof. Welch said that China's claims are poorly understood. While China claims all of the territorial features in the South China Sea, it has never explicitly claimed complete maritime jurisdiction (See Welch 7). However, China clearly believed that it was entitled to more expansive maritime jurisdiction than is permitted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus, China's loss in the Philippines Arbitration case was humiliating.

However, China has been doing its best to comply with the substance of the ruling even while denouncing it so as not to be seen as an outlaw state internationally but also not to be seen domestically as having suffered a loss of face.

With an increased number of US Navy ships sailing near features claimed by China, Prof. Welch feared that “conflict in the South China Sea will break out because of some incident between an American naval vessel and a Chinese ship, and that is a real fear because the Chinese navy is not yet fully professionalized. China is new to blue water navy operations, and it is still learning how to do it in a safe and professional way; therefore, the danger of some kind of accidental conflict is real.”

The other two flashpoints of North Korea and Taiwan are also very serious, he said. North Korea’s need for nuclear armament for security is incompatible with the US goal of a denuclearized North Korea. Prof. Welch said that the Taiwan Strait, which is not a crisis today, will be the most serious flashpoint in East Asia in the end. He believes that Taiwan will not willingly return to China and that the key question is what will China lose first – patience or interest?


Prof. Welch said it is difficult for both the G20 and the UN to gain traction on the flashpoints in East Asia, mostly due to the absence of unity, as China and the US are involved in the G20 and UN and both disagree on many of the issues. The G20 itself has no particular niche in which to influence the East Asian flashpoints, compared to many other organizations and forums in the Asia-Pacific region promoting security and the UN does not have the capacity to take on effective and timely governance roles.

He said the G20 tends not to make hard security commitments, and he did not expect any at the Osaka Summit. It would be positive if there was an attempt to cultivate empathy, i.e., for the leaders to work harder to see the world through each other’s eyes. Washington does not understand how Beijing sees the world and vice versa, which is very dangerous.

Welch 1




Number of conflicts by type



Welch 2




Number of conflicts by region




Welch 3




Welch 4




Welch 5



Welch 6



Welch 7



**Keynote Address: Japan’s G20 Summit: Plans, Prospects & Possibilities**

Prof. Izumi Ohno, director of JICA Research Institute of Japan, and Prof. John Kirton, director and founder of the G20 Research Group, presented at this session. Prof. Ohno introduced three points for discussion: What is the Think 20 (T20)?

Ohno 1

## T20 Japan Task Forces

JICA RI has coordinated two TFs:

**TF1: 2030 Agenda (SDGs) & TF5: Cooperation with Africa**

TF1	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	JICA RI
TF2	An International Financial Architecture for Stability and Development/Cryptocurrency and Fintech	IIMA
TF3	Climate Change and Environment	IGES & MRI
TF4	Economic Effects of Infrastructure and its Financing	ADB I
TF5	Cooperation with Africa	AfDB & JICA RI
TF6	Social Cohesion, Global Governance and the Future of Politics	JIIA
TF7	The Future of Work and Education for the Digital Age	ADB I
TF8	Trade, Investment and Globalization	RIETI
TF9	SME Policy faced with Development of Financial Technology	RIETI
TF10	Ageing Population and its Economic Impact + Immigration	ADB I & KDI


What has the T20 been discussing, particularly the taskforce on the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and SDG-related issues? What should we be thinking about the G20 Osaka Summit including possible collaboration with the UN?

Regarding the T20, it is a research and policy advice network for the G20 as one of the engagement groups independent from the Japanese government. It started in 2012 for the G20 Los Cabos Summit in Mexico. There are many other engagement groups such as Business 20 (B20), Civil 20 (C20), Labour 20 (L20), Science 20 (S20), Urban 20 (U20), Women's 20 (W20), and the Youth 20 (Y20), and for T20 Japan, ten taskforces were developed with lots of participation from various think tanks abroad and in Japan (See Ohno 1).

The T20 engages with the G20 by delivering a communiqué, which presents innovative policy recommendations that equip G20 members to seek a sustainable, inclusive, and resilient society. It emphasizes the importance of the new global goals, including the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

Regarding the SDGs, she said it has great importance with a universal agenda aimed at sustainability for everyone, with commitments made by all members involved. Although making efforts, she believes much more can be done for the actions to be truly effective. The G20 members have the potential to make major progress as they account for a significant portion of global GDP and two thirds of the world population.

Ohno 2



(Source) Bertelsmann Stiftung & SDSN (2018). SDG Index and DashBoards Report 2018

Ohno 3


### SDG Dashboard for Selected OECD Countries



(Source) Bertelsmann Stiftung & SDSN (2018). SDG Index and DashBoards Report 2018

Ohno 4

### SDG Dashboard for East and South Asia



(Source) Bertelsmann Stiftung & SDSN (2018). SDG Index and DashBoards Report 2018

Ohno 5

**SDG Dashboard for Sub-Saharan Africa (selected countries)**



(Source) Bertelsmann Stiftung & SDSN (2018). SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2018

Ohno 6

**The 2030 Agenda (TF1): Overview of Policy Briefs**

**Universal Health Coverage**

Giving due consideration to the discussions at the Health Working Group (Sherpa Track) and the Finance Track. New

- G20's role in achieving Universal Health Coverage for all.

**Education**

Focusing on education in development as an enabler of SDGs

- Quality education, socio-emotional skills, Early childhood development, STEM, girls education, professionals development, etc.

**Finance & Governance**

- Catalyzing and mobilizing private capital for SDGs; improving the allocation of development finance; and establishing funding measures for global public goods.

**The Role of the Private Sector** New

- Embedding SDGs into core business strategies & operations; reshaping the economic system around the common purpose; creating a sustainable ecosystem; and supporting industrial & social upgrading of developing countries.

**Technology Cooperation** New

- Importance of STI & availability of innovation-driven solutions; supporting best practices of technology cooperation.

**Gender**

Closely working with W20 & C20 (and other engagement groups).

- Labor equity, Finance equity, Digital equity
- Governance (private sector, public sector, measuring progress)

Prof. Ohno shared a chart on the performance of G20 members on the SDG index (See Ohno 2). She pointed out that Nordic countries along with Japan and Canada had high scores. She then shared the SDG dashboards for selected member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (See Ohno 3), for East and South Asia (See Ohno 4), and for Sub-Saharan Africa (See Ohno 5). The charts help identify exactly the goals on which each country is working. Although the data shows clearly that countries are working on improving their scores, it is also evident that much more effort is needed with certain goals still, even for advanced countries such as Japan.

Covering the key features of the 2030 Agenda and SDG Taskforce, she said

the vision for leaving no one behind is very important to their philosophy of development cooperation. The taskforce formulated concrete policy recommendations on six topics: universal health coverage, education in development, sustainable finance for development, the private sector's role for achieving the SDGs, technology cooperation and gender issues (See Ohno 6). These topics were chosen with due consideration to the priorities of the Japanese government as well as the discussions at the recent T20.

Prof. Ohno shared an excerpt from the 2019 T20 Summit Communiqué: “The Sustainable Development Goals aim to realize a world ‘that leaves no one behind’ by 2030. G20 countries must take bold and transformative steps to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda by taking a human-centered approach that contributes to building a sustainable health system for all and promotes education in development and women’s economic empowerment. It is also critically important for G20 countries to scale up the impact of business on inclusive and sustainable development and establish a global framework for mobilizing and catalyzing capital and facilitating technological cooperation, based on the principles of access, equity and inclusion for developing countries.” She then shared the T20’s recommendations for each policy (Ohno 7).

Prof. Ohno concluded by talking about the G20’s development over the years. She said that the nature of the G20 has evolved greatly since its initiation in 2008. Initially, it acted in response to the GFC and worked on macroeconomic and finance issues, but due to political developments, since then, the scope of G20 has broadened, with its mandate including growing issues such as climate change, energy needs, health, and migration. The role of the G20 should have a significant impact on the world, and more so compared to the G7 with the G20’s inclusion of developing economies. However, she said it is worth discussing whether the G20 really represents the whole world and if the involved members are diverse enough. She concluded by saying that she hopes the current leaders can push for multilateralism. Partnering with the UN could be important as they can convene all the member states, including developing countries, and can promote southern cooperation, including emerging economies, and so can serve as a platform. The UN has mechanisms for monitoring SDG implementation and can provide sector-specific expertise, statistical data, and information.

Next, Prof. Kirton began his presentation by stating that the G20 summit in Osaka is not just another international event, as it launches the second decade of G20 summitry and is also the first meeting held in Japan. He said that the other leaders finally recognized Japan’s importance in the world and Japanese leadership having seen how Japan has led within the G20 up until now. It has only been seven months since the last summit, but even with having less time than other hosts have

## Ohno 7

**Lead Tractable Changes and Global Solidarity Towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC)**

- Re-orient and harmonize development assistance to strengthen primary healthcare systems. In addition, promote reliable, efficient and self-sufficient domestic financing mechanisms based on experience and best practice-sharing.
- Establish a reliable migrant information system to ensure health and social security benefit parity between migrant and local workers.
- Establish a G20 working group on harnessing and regulating health technologies at the global level.

**Transform Education Systems to Provide All Children with Quality Education**

- Strengthen G20 commitment to advancing access to locally and culturally appropriate quality Early Childhood Development (ECD)/Early Childhood Education and care (ECEC) for all children from birth, and build international consensus on government responsibility for a "whole-systems" approach to ECD/ECEC policies.
- Develop baseline data and targeted action to help marginalized girls and boys and achieve gender equality in education and promote research and practice on non-cognitive "socioemotional skills" to transform traditional schooling systems.
- Agree on timely policy measures within G20 countries to enhance STEM education, particularly basic mathematics and science. Emphasis should be on cultivating the interest of children in STEM education.

**Drive Capital at Scale Towards Sustainable Development and Ensure Improved Allocation of Development Finance**

- Share the good experiences derived from expanding sustainable finance especially those involving large institutional investors and national and int'l development banks in a way G20 member countries, and pursue actions that boost private financing for social good.
- Build the capacity of developing countries to create sector-specific platforms for generating coherent and high-quality project proposals linked to national development plans, partnership with MDBs and UN agencies.
- Institute a systematic approach to aid replenishment negotiations based on an agreed upon set of core principles and encourage greater use of innovative finance mechanisms.

**Redefine the Purpose of Business and Create a "Sustainable Ecosystem" for Shaping Beneficial Environments for All Stakeholders**

- Urge the private sector to embed sustainability into core business strategies and operations and link corporate reporting to the SDGs based on a common framework and standards. In addition, raise incentives for joint business actions for social good by showcasing such arrangements at major international events.
- Reshape the economic system around a common purpose by promoting ESG investment as well as sustainable procurement in the public sector.
- Promote "Quality FDI" to developing countries and support their industrial and social upgrading so that they can benefit from GVC participation and avoid the risk of inappropriate supply chain management by FDI.

**Create Alternative Mechanisms for Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation, Building the Technological Financial Capabilities of Developing Countries**

- Establish a comprehensive technology facilitation mechanism, including technology banks, to accelerate and incentivize technology transfer to developing countries.
- Develop a global action plan to promote open access to data and science and technology information, and adopt new regulation models that govern innovation in ways that advance global public good.
- Integrate science, technology and innovation cooperation into strategies for the achievement of the SDGs and promote good practices towards this objective among G20 countries.

**Promote Women's Economic Empowerment**

- Remove systemic legal and social barriers in the labor market that disproportionately limit women's labor force participation and countries' potential to deal with demographic transition, especially by adopting policies that recognize, reduce, redistribute and represent unpaid care and domestic work, and by presenting mid-term reports on the 2014 Brisbane commitment on "25 by 25."
- Improve women's economic empowerment data availability, analysis and quality in the public and private sectors, recognizing that data inputs are essential for quality policy design, benchmarking and measuring implementation and accountability progress.
- Mainstream gender in public policymaking and require private and third sector entities to adopt and report on gender policies and outcomes.

had, he was impressed with how well Japan has been able to prepare the summit.

Compared to the single challenge of preventing the global financial collapse back in 2008, the G20 has many more challenges to work on now. He said the G20 is dealing with broader and even more important issues than before, such as the escalating tensions with US-China trade and technology, the global climate crisis, rapid disruptive digitalization, ageing population, slowing economic growth, and the declining faith in the world liberal order and multilateral organizations that make that work.

For the Osaka Summit, Prof. Kirton said Japan should be congratulated for taking on a broad agenda instead of simply sending many of them off to the likes of the G7. The toughest issues up front are the following: free trade, data free flow with trust, quality infrastructure, international health, climate change, ocean marine litter, and so on. He said he believed that the Osaka Summit would be a substantial success for the following reasons. The first reason is the proven performance of the G20 over the first decade. The second reason is the experienced democratic leadership by individuals committed to multilateralism and openness led by the host Shinzo Abe, and the third reason is the several innovative ministerial meetings that

**Kirton 1 G20 Summit Performance, 2008-2018**

	Grade	Domestic political management			Deliberation			Direction setting				Decision making	Delivery		Development of global governance			
		Attendance	# compliments	% members complimented	# days	# documents	# words	Stability	Inclusion	Democracy	Liberty	# commitments	Compliance	# Assessed	Internal		External	
															# references	Spread	# references	Spread
2008	A-	100%	0	0%	2	2	3,567	16	2	10	2	95	75%	8	0	4	39	11
2009 L <sup>a</sup>	A	100%	1	5%	2	3	6,155	29	6	9	0	129	57%	7	12	4	120	27
2009 P <sup>b</sup>	A-	100%	0	0%	2	2	9,257	11	21	28	1	128	67%	15	47	4	115	26
2010 T <sup>c</sup>	A-	90%	8	15%	2	5	11,078	47	32	11	1	61	68%	15	71	4	164	27
2010 S <sup>d</sup>	B	95%	5	15%	2	5	15,776	66	36	18	4	153	67%	41	99	4	237	31
2011	B	95%	11	35%	2	3	14,107	42	8	22	0	282	74%	22	59	4	247	27
2012	A-	95%	6	15%	2	2	12,682	43	23	31	3	180	77%	19	65	4	138	20
2013	A	90%	15	55%	2	11	28,766	73	108	15	3	281	69%	24	190	4	237	27
2014	B	90%	10	40%	2	5	9,111	10	12	1	0	205	72%	26	39	4	42	12
2015	B	90%	0	0%	2	6	5,983	13	22	0	2	198	71%	23	42	4	54	11
2016	B+	95%	7	25%	2	4	16,004	11	29	34	5	213	73%	24	179	4	223	19
2017	B+	95%	0	0	2	10	34,746	42	61	2	11	529	85%	17	54	6	307	19
2018	B-	90	0	0	2	2	13,515	23	53	7	2	128	77%	20	20	5	24	15
Total	N/A	N/A	68	N/A	26	60	180,747	403	360	188	34	2,582	N/A	229	877	55	1,947	272
Average	N/A	95%	5.67	19%	2	4.6	13,904	33.58	30	15	3	199	71%	20	67	4	150	21

Notes:

<sup>a</sup> London; <sup>b</sup> Pittsburgh; <sup>c</sup> Toronto; <sup>d</sup> Seoul.

N/A = not applicable. Only documents issued at a summit in the leaders' name are included.

Grade is based on a scoring scheme created by John Kirton, as follows: A+ Extremely Strong, A Very Strong, A- Strong, B+ Significant, B Substantial, B- Solid, C Small, D Very Small, F Failure (including made things worse). available at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/scoring.html>.

Domestic political management: participation by G20 members and at least one representative from the European Union and excludes invited countries; compliments are references to full members in summit documents.

Deliberation: duration of the summit and the documents collectively released in the leaders' name at the summit.

Direction setting: number of statements of fact, causation, and rectitude relating directly to open democracy and individual liberty.

Decision making: number of commitments as identified by the G20 Research Group.

Delivery: scores are measured on a scale from -1 (no compliance) to +1 (full compliance, or fulfilment of goal set out in commitment). Figures are cumulative scores based on compliance reports. \* = 2017 is an interim score and is excluded from the cumulative average.

Development of global governance: internal are references to G20 institutions in summit documents; external are references to institutions outside the G20; engagement groups are references to engagement groups. Spread indicates the number of different institutions mentioned. Brittany Warren compiled 2018, 190123

were held leading up this summit. There is good reason to believe that the more ministerial meetings are held, the more successful the summits will be.

Prof. Kirton presented a chart displaying the summit performance for each member between 2008 and 2018 (Kirton 1). Looking at the final column with global governance, starting with 39 references to 11 different multilateral organizations, one can see an expansion in the numbers over the years. According to Prof. Kirton, the G20 works for the UN, and that the G20 is a tremendous help to the UN.

On the broad substantial success, Prof. Kirton went through the agenda and prospective achievements for the G20 Osaka Summit. Starting with data free flow

and trust, he believed the leaders would agree to launch the Osaka Track of negotiations under the umbrella of the WTO. For trade, a truce could be expected for US-China, as President Trump was turning from escalation to cooperation. For climate change, he said there would be an emphasis on clean energy. According to Prof. Kirton, for the environment, we are off to a good start with the implementation of litter clean-up projects. Regarding tax, he said they would agree at Osaka that in one year they would decide on a revolutionary new system for taxation, endorsing the OECD-G20 principles on the new user – customer nexus.

For health, Prof. Kirton said the leaders would probably agree on the importance of bringing universal health coverage to developing countries by 2030, and agree that the money should come primarily from domestic resources and not just rely on international donors. He said we would likely see agreements made on quality infrastructure, and better governance transparency on who was responsible for building what, and the costs for building and maintaining infrastructure. Finally, on gender, he said recent developments showed promise, and he expected leaders to agree on good things that help reduce the gender gap in the workplace. However, there is the need to do much more on gender equality as a whole as women's rights in the home space are excluded from the discussions. He said the W 20 engagement group would certainly help in that regard. "But, at the end of the day, it is the leaders that make the difference."

### **What Is Wrong with Multilateralism: Revitalizing Liberal World Order**

This session was presented by Prof. Mackenzie Clugston, Rector of the Cross-Cultural College Program of KGU and former ambassador of Canada to Japan, and Prof. Takahiro Shinyo, Dean of the Integrated Center for UN and Foreign Affairs Studies of KGU, former ambassador of the permanent mission of Japan to the UN and former ambassador of Japan to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Prof. Clugston opened his lecture talking about the uncertainties we have in our global institutions and world liberal order. He said events such as the G20 lend stability and substance to the liberal world order. According to him, we take post-WWII institutions, life, and society for granted. People born in developed societies know only that and not a world that is unstable.

He then followed with the history of the world liberal order and the formations of global organizations after WWII. He described how the US and allied nations established institutions, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN, dedicated to global security and economic progress, and most importantly to avoid mistakes made in the aftermath of World War I, especially regarding the Treaty of Versailles.

Multilateralism progressed after the fall of the Soviet Union, with NATO expanding. More democratic countries began pushing for human rights, democracy, and liberal economic practices through multilateral forums. However, Prof. Clugston said resistance to multilateralism became an issue as the liberal order agenda became increasingly effective. Challenges and skepticism facing multilateralism was nothing new. The UN, especially, was affected since its inception, as people doubted the degree to which national sovereignty and power should be subordinated to such institutions.

Revisionist states, prominently those in the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, oppose the liberal order. According to Prof. Clugston, such nations tend to be authoritarian and seek control over their populations, economy, and so on. Revisionist states that are furthering their objectives through organizations of their choosing are weakening the legitimacy of multilateral institutions. China and Russia are enthusiastic supporters of multipolarity and regionalism, pursuing their agendas through institutions that reflect their own principles, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the New Development Bank, and the Eurasia Economic Union.

Global mechanisms such as the G7 and G20 were created to fill a need that major multilateral organizations could not meet. Although not antithetical to multilateralism themselves, they allow for a way forward on global issues.

Globalization and technology drive innovation and economic growth but they are also drivers of rising inequality. On the foreign policy front, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to the disillusionment in the use of the US military power. Many of the US's citizens consider the global policing role the US has played for seven decades as something that no longer serves their national interest.

Prof. Clugston said with what he can read and see, the world liberal order is intact, being supported by a powerful coalition of states. However, he questioned whether the US would remain committed to a liberal world order. "Are Americans still committed to securing this peace and sharing the economic spoils? Are they prepared to share control of the order with rising states, notably China, as I believe they probably must?"

He also said middle-sized countries, which have benefitted from the liberal order greatly, have the obligation to pick up the slack and demonstrate through action their commitment to the cause. Western politicians should be more open and courageous in articulating policies that deal with major global issues. We should seek efforts to reshape our economies and wage inequality must be addressed if the average citizen is to continue believing in the capitalistic system. Monopolistic tech firms must be curtailed through reworked tax and competition policies, workers need access to opportunities, and politicians should become more active.

Organizations such as the OECD and the G20 are very helpful in mapping out policy direction. However, ultimately, domestic politicians get to put legislation into effect. He questioned whether partisan populist politics could be put aside for serious discussions instead.

He concluded his presentation by saying that he believes these are precarious times. We are fortunate to be in a stable country such as Japan, which is also enjoying stable leadership and a solid economy. Therefore, it is hard to consider what is going on in Europe as well as the US, but the bottom line is that countries such as Canada, Germany, and Japan have to continue to demonstrate their commitment to the liberal world order to help extend what has been beneficial to everyone.

Next, Prof. Shinyo began his presentation by describing how the Lehman shock in 2008 ended the unipolar world and a world economic dominated by the US, which allowed a step towards globalism. This meant the arrival of a new multilateralism embracing new emerging economies. However, ever since China overtook Japan to become the world's second largest economy in 2010, this new multipolar world has taken shape where its politics and economy cannot be managed without the involvement of major emerging economies.

Prof. Shinyo said that the decision of Brexit in 2016 and the start of the Trump presidency in 2017 are the results of the ever-worsening wealth inequality and the refugee crisis in advanced countries. He said these were negative impacts of globalization, advanced in part by the G20 and involved emerging economies. The expanding gap between the rich and poor, increase of migrants, rise in nationalism and populism, and inward-looking nationalistic attitudes are all the results of globalization. The Trump administration has been withdrawing from multilateralism and has introduced trade protectionism under the America First policy. In addition, the UK voted to withdraw from the EU to maximize its own national interests.

Regarding economic development since WWII, the introduction of democracy, freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law were all key developments for economic growth and prosperity. Building up nations based on those liberal democratic values has been a prerequisite for many countries in their advancement. However, Prof. Shinyo said the emergence of China as an economic giant demonstrated that a country can become an economic power without the same western values, instead successfully implementing state capitalism instead of capitalism based on free democratic principles. Emerging countries and existing authoritarian nations such as Russia have since began marching forward without introducing liberal values. He said the philosophy in strengthening the liberal world order based on western values, upheld by the likes of US and Canada, faces tremendous challenges today.

“The question for many countries is a choice whether they should opt for liberal world order or authoritarian order for attaining the effective development of the economy. Until recently, liberalism and globalism have been compatible with each other. However, due to the political shift in world politics, it could also be foreseen that globalism having high affinity with authoritarianism may prevail. Thus, turning our world into an age of classic style of confrontation between liberalism and non-liberalism, this is the clash of values, rather than the clash of civilizations.”

Prof. Shinyo also said there was concern that the US and China trade war would escalate into a hegemonic competition, and potentially turn into a new cold war. In his opinion, we must avoid the division of the world again.

“Quite contrary to the pre-war time we have today multilateral tools and mechanisms of the UN and G20, of which all major developed and developing nations are a part of. Important global issues, such as trade issues, environmental issues, and energy shortages, cannot be solved without close cooperation between the developed and developing countries. Therefore, the key is how to use the existing mechanism of the UN and the G20 effectively on case-by-case basis. This must be the guiding principle for the diplomacy in a multipolar world of no leaders.”

According to Prof. Shinyo, both China and the US are reluctant in solving problems through a multilateral framework, preferring bilateral negotiations. To overcome this, a virtuous cycle of sustainable economic development and sound multilateralism is necessary. For the multilateral framework to be effective, he called for the reform of the UN and the WTO.

“For tackling global issues, bilateral approach has its limit and is not enough. A comprehensive and effective multilateral framework like the G20 is needed. However, we have to address the issue of how to establish cooperative relations between the G20 and the truly universal multilateral framework as the UN. It could be said that the relationship between the UN and the G20 could be comparable to the correlation between the deductive and inductive approach. While the international community tries to tackle the pressing issue based on the agreement by G20 one by one, the problems arising out of the implementation stage and concrete attainments could be fed back to the UN. The UN can discuss those feedbacks, also regularly reviewing the implementation of the SDGs so that a new consensus could be formed as an amendment to the already existing general principles.”

“The relationship between the UN and G20 could be vertical rather than horizontal, thus avoiding confrontation and parallel competition between the two. A deductive approach and an inductive approach are mutually reinforcing. This vertical cooperation could be a new type of multilateralism, and is somewhat similar to the

philosophy and guiding principle of the EU – namely the subsidiarity principle. This new mode of cooperation based on the subsidiarity principle could be a model for the relationship between the G20 and the UN, giving greater responsibility to G20, to solve the problems closer to the people in accordance with people first principle.”

### **UN Challenges to 2030**

Prof. Jun Kukita, Chief Coordinator of KG Career Center for International Organizations of KGU, who has worked for UNICEF agency for children for 30 years, and Prof. Keiko Nishino, Associate Dean of UN and Foreign Affairs Studies Program Office of KGU, who has long experience with UNICEF, presented this session.

Prof. Kukita began by covering his points for the session. He highlighted the fundamental challenge for the G20 and UN partnership in achieving the SDGs, and suggested a paradigm shift from profitability to sustainability in a post-capitalism world. He saw a paradox in the G20’s contributions to achieving the SDGs, with the G20 focusing mostly on maintaining the current economic system and not the whole of the SDGs.

The problems that the SDGs deal with are issues that are created by humans ourselves, many of which are the result of mass expansion and economic growth based on the paradigm of capitalism. In a capitalist system everything is measured by money, tangible products, and services. Prof. Kukita said that communities that were initially untouched by the system were seen as frontiers, and once the market economy was introduced to them, they were integrated into the global monetary and financial system. This process is described as globalization in the capitalist world, and it affects all aspects of society. In the capitalist world, people’s decisions are based primarily on whether something is profitable, cheap, or has a high-end cost-performance – value for the money has been the primary concern.

During the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, to boost investment and growth, humans extensively started using fossil fuels, exploiting cheap labor of poor nations, and using potentially catastrophic nuclear power. According to Prof. Kukita, the market economy made these practices along with mass production, mass consumption, mass waste, and mass exploitation look welcoming and valuable. They raised the standard of living for many in the process, but widened the gap between the rich and poor as well. As the world economy grew, the damage to the planet was overlooked and scientists’ early warnings, including Club of Rome’s, were mostly ignored right up until the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Now global warming and climate change are likely irreversible, and with more regimes with nuclear capabilities, nuclear warfare remains a threat to humanity.

As wealth and resources become more concentrated in the top percentile of society, the gaps between the rich and poor widens. In poor or underdeveloped regions, the destruction created by systematic exploitation of the global market is accelerating conflicts over limited resources. More people try to leave areas affected and head to more stable nations, and this leads to mass involuntary migration that Prof. Kukita said would only worsen over time, as habitat is lost to man-made natural disasters, rising sea levels, etc. due to climate change.

Prof. Kukita said he was most concerned about the gaps and destruction in the world, and that the human potential and capability to overcome and solve these problems are being lost. More than half the world population lives in poverty and in difficult conditions, without access to basic education, nutrition and health services, a stable society to grow, and opportunities to participate in the society.

“The current world situation indicates that relying on the current capitalist paradigm or the miracle of the invisible hand is not working anymore. Rather it further exacerbates climate emergencies, widening disparity and other problems,” said Prof. Kukita. The transition to a new paradigm is inevitable, he added, as a small number of rich capitalists drain wealth not only from the poor, but also from the middle class, which was seen as the mainstay of growth and democracy. In addition, advanced information technology and the use of crypto currency are rendering the current financial model obsolete.

Prof. Kukita said that, in finding a post-capitalism paradigm to shift to, “the global risks that we are facing indicate that the destiny of humans will end with either the collapse of the biosphere, or explosion of the social bomb or even the World War III nuclear warfare. Our own destiny will end with the end of the global society . . . Therefore, our utmost priority is now survival, and managing the transition to a sustainable world and certainly not accumulating the excessive wealth. Everything will need to be assessed based on the criteria of whether it leads to a sustainable world and not whether it is more profitable.”

Prof. Kukita argued to achieve the SDGs the G20 needs to change, and that may only be possible by transforming or completely scraping the economic system they were made to maintain, namely, the money-centered capitalist financial system. He suggested that the G20 use the SDGs and their principles to help transform the current financial system into a human- and earth-friendly one that enables us to protect the ecosystem. The G20 should “backcast” from the sustainable world of SDGs, and find and choose innovative options, institutions, and lifestyles rather than forecasting from where we are with the old paradigm.

Next, Prof. Nishino’s presentation focused primarily on the gender equality issue and its treatment in the G20. She pointed out the listed issue for the Osaka Summit “women’s empowerment”, and said it should have been on gender issues or

gender empowerment instead. She said the Japanese government argued all themes included women’s issues, so gender-specific ministerial meetings were unnecessary. She also pointed out that the issue focused on labor issues only and was limiting.


Prof. Nishino said the C 20 had declared that SDG 16, peace and justice and strong institutions, enables and accelerates all the SDGs regarding human security. She provided a video for audience members not familiar with the human security approach titled “The UNSSC Human Security Approach”.

According to Prof. Nishino, the G20 needs to realize the importance of both human security and the SDGs, especially in consideration of gender equality. To build an inclusive and resilient society, the G20 should tackle the issue of empowerment of people and not just women alone.


For commitment implementation by institutionalization for SDGs by G20 members, she provided a chart with scores for each member, although it is based on an initial assessment of the government’s efforts to implement the SDGs (See Nishino 1). Although Brazil, Mexico, and Italy show high levels of institutionalization, political commitment to SDGs by Russia and the US are far lower.

She then shared a graph that indicated which nations had monitoring mechanisms in place for implementing the SDGs (See Nishino 2) and a table for the SDG index ranking and scores for each nation (See Nishino 3). Following that, she provided a table for the gender index ranking based on the same table as SDGs achievement (See Nishino 4). She pointed out that Japan’s overall score in the G20 was relatively high at fourth place, and gender ranking was below Indonesia at 16<sup>th</sup> place. However, South Africa’s overall score put it in 18<sup>th</sup> place, while gender

Nishino 1



Nishino 2



SDGs Index and Dashboards Report 2018, p4

Nishino 3

## SDG Index ranking

The 2018 Global SDG Index ranking and scores					
4	Germany	82.3	54	China	70.1
5	France	81.2	56	Brazil	69.7
14	United Kingdom	78.7	63	Russian Federation	68.9
15	Japan	78.5	79	Turkey	66.0
19	Korea, Rep	77.4	84	Mexico	65.2
20	Canada	76.8	98	Saudi Arabia	62.9
29	Italy	74.2	99	Indonesia	62.8
35	United States	73.0	107	South Africa	60.8
37	Australia	72.9	112	India	59.1
53	Argentina	70.3	NA	EU	

Source: SDGs Index and Dashboards Report 2018, pp.16-17

ranking was 2<sup>nd</sup>. Following that, Prof. Nishino presented the gender gap index (See Nishino 5). She expressed disappointment in Japan being in 110<sup>th</sup> place in the world, which was 16<sup>th</sup> place in G20.

Examining the G20 Osaka Summit, especially focusing on the goal of gender issues, Prof. Nishino questioned why the G20 focuses on women only and not gender, with LGBTQ issues not even mentioned. Why do G20 members recognize and encourage women to participate in the labor market without reducing the gender

## Nishino 4

## Goal 5 (Gender) Index ranking

4	Germany	82.2	10	China	75.6
1	France	86.8	13	Brazil	68.3
3	United Kingdom	82.9	12	Russian Federation	71.6
16	Japan	61.7	17	Turkey	53.3
14	Korea, Rep	67.4	8	Mexico	76.5
5	Canada	81.1	18	Saudi Arabia	43.6
11	Italy	74.1	15	Indonesia	62.1
9	United States	75.9	2	South Africa	83.1
6	Australia	79.9	19	India	36.4
7	Argentina	78.5	NA	EU	

Source: SDGs Index and Dashboards Report 2018, pp.16-17

## Nishino 5

## Gender Gap Index

12	France	75	Russian Federation
14	Germany	85	Indonesia
15	United Kingdom	95	Brazil
16	Canada	103	China
19	South Africa	108	India
36	Argentine	110	Japan
39	Australia	115	Korea, Rep.
50	Mexico	130	Turkey
51	USA	141	Saudi Arabia
70	Italy	NA	EU

The Global Gender Gap Report 2018

gap? In addition, why is there an action plan but no monitoring and evaluation mechanism or roadmap? Furthermore, how would G20 members deal with gender issues next year when Saudi Arabia holds the presidency? She hoped that gender issues would continue to be discussed at future summits, and would not just be limited to the context of the labor force but to all social settings.

### **Panel Discussion: Prospects and Possibilities for G20-UN Partnership at Osaka**

The panelists comprised Prof. John Kirton, Prof. David Welch, Prof. Izumi Ohno, and Prof. Shunichi Murata, and was moderated by Prof. Takahiro Shinyo.

Prof. Murata opened the discussion by asking who decides the agenda of the G20. He also asked about the consultation processes in agenda formulation. Does the host country have autonomy on the decision making, or is it decided through consultation with the members? The G20 does not talk about the UN so much; instead, the G20 talks about the financial institutions a lot more. Now with Japan depending on the developing countries, how do we make south-south cooperation effective?

Prof. Murata also pointed out the world trend for increasing military expenditure in connection with GDP, while official development assistance (ODA) has been decreasing. This is a worrying trend leading to a potentially more dangerous world.

Answering the question posed by Prof. Murata on agenda formulation, Prof. Kirton said that there were several responsible components. The first responsible component is the agenda is driven by events. In the case of the 2008 Washington Summit, the GFC drove the G20's agenda. Therefore, the summit's focus was on financial regulation and preventing an economic catastrophe through macroeconomic policy, and from then on, this became the built-in agenda for the following summits. According to Prof. Kirton, the second responsible component is because the G20 is genuinely a club of equals, countries cannot tell one another what issues to deal with directly.

The summit host has increasing discretion to add items. In the case of Japan, it added the issue of ageing. A credible case was made for including that issue because it has major implications for fiscal policy and it can be related back to the financial core agenda of the G20.

Prof. Shinyo asked the panelists two questions: If the ODA of advanced countries was decreasing, then why not depend on the richer south to aid the poor south? In addition, even if just two percent of the military budget were used for ODA instead, it would benefit humanity greatly, but why does the G20 not deal with this issue?

Prof. Ohno answered that in developing south-south cooperation, currently, there is no dedicated taskforce for these topics in T20. South-south cooperation needs more attention, although there is some discussion covering the issue with science and technology cooperation in facilitating technology for the benefit of the south. She said more concrete discussion was needed. According to Prof. Ohno, another issue was the attention given to the private sector because of how the

majority of corporations work and how much impact large corporations have on the entire supply chain in both developed and emerging countries. Managing supply chains is critical if we are to assess, for example, who is developing cocoa or palm oil, and assess labor issues, environmental impacts, and quality issues that are part of the processes involved.

On military spending, Prof. Welch equated it to a form of insurance, spending on defense against what one hopes is an unlikely contingency. Each country must decide what proportion of its national wealth is worth spending on defense, and some countries do better at this than others. Regarding Japan, he said the defense budget is relatively low, with most of it being personnel costs, which he argues is good for the economy. In comparison, he said, the US spends too much on defense, and because of that, the military has become “the only tool in their toolbox” for foreign policy. Regarding why the G20 does not discuss military spending, Prof. Welch said it is because members could not possibly reach an agreement.

Regarding accountability issues, Prof. Ohno said because there are no formal accountability mechanisms in place for the G20, there are many engagement groups in its governance system instead, such as the B20, C20, and T20. Especially, the T20 operates with the collaboration of various think tanks all over the world involving people from many different countries, many of which are affiliated with G20 countries, but also actively including many African, Asian, and Latin-American experts. She said these are great in acting as a counterbalance to country-specific led organizations. She said engagement groups are helping stimulate active discussion across the globe.

On the GDP-based system, Prof. Welch agreed that GDP is a destructive way to measure economic productivity and wealth. “It does not distinguish between spending that contributes to a public good and spending that is either wasteful or detracts from the public good. So, you spend a dollar on health care, which counts just as much in your GDP as spending a dollar on plastic waste that is going to clog the oceans and kill the whales.” He also stated that, “GDP takes no account of externalities, so we need something that takes account of externalities, natural capital accounting is the obvious place to start, but you must make people count on their balance sheets the negative costs of their economic activity as well.” According to Prof. Welch, there is not much enthusiasm for changing how things are simply because people are not very welcoming of change to our livelihoods.

Prof. Kirton said governments need a current account and capital account, with actual ecological capital at the core of the capital account. “Economy and ecology don’t go together hand and glove . . . You need the ecology to have an economy and not the other way around, so ecological capital should come first.” For the second point, as GDP is pretty much “produce it, use it and lose it”, what is needed

instead is a measure to capture the flow, as with the concept of circular economy – something that retains its value and ideally even increases as it is used repeatedly. He said there is hope for the G20 going in that direction.

Prof. Murata clarified his earlier point, that following the Lehman shock in 2008, the G20 pushed for less government intervention, which allowed the free flow of capital flow with less regulation, and this is the problem. He argued that the global damage from the economy created by the G20 was enormous, and it was vital that the governments' capacity to monitor and intervene timeously was enhanced.

On how to unite the G20 process with the UN, and regarding the SDGs, Prof. Welch said that the lack and poor quality of data make it difficult to assess progress towards achieving the SDGs. Another issue he pointed out was that the goals are not consistent in some cases. Gender equality clashes with the ontological security of culture and religions, which are intrinsically patriarchal and misogynistic. Providing those securities could hinder gender equality, and Prof. Welch questioned if there was a way to have both goals met, or whether one had to be prioritized over the other. Prof. Nishino answered that it is important to respect both diversity and culture; however, also with the SDGs and gender equality, the important issue is equal opportunity and equal opportunity for decision making. She believes that society should be able to decide on which goal is most important for it to work.

On how to deal with possibly conflicting goals, Prof. Ohno said balancing and harmonizing the goals together was key, and it was necessary to find a way for goals to comfortably be achievable together. While monitoring a single goal on its own, achieving it may appear sustainable. However, achieving that goal would potentially affect the chance of achieving other goals. She said countries needed to have a national vision of what to achieve and decide how to pursue the SDGs so that they could each be achieved without harming each other.

Prof. Shinyo asked the panelists the final question on what they thought was possible in bridging the G20 and UN.

As far as the SDGs and 2030 agendas were concerned, Prof. Ohno said that Prime Minister Abe is likely willing to present the results of the G20 on the SDG discussion to the high-level political forum at the UN. According to Prof. Ohno, the government has created an SDG promotion headquarters within the Prime Minister's Office, and it meets at the cabinet level bi-annually; therefore, the G20 outcome should be presented at the high-level forum. She said it would be good to make that process more routine for a G20 and UN connection.

Prof. Kirton said that although the G20 dealt with the 2008 GFC, today it faces the even greater issue of climate change. Although the G20 agenda has expanded enormously from the economic core, he said it was unacceptable that the members

went on “semi-retirement” from two summits each year to just one annual summit. They should return to having two. He suggested that instead of going through the trouble of scheduling summits at different locations with different hosts, the G20 should hold a second summit at the UN since the members are already present.

Second, he said that having the World Bank and the IMF as permanent members of the G20 was outdated as the agenda no longer deals only with financial issues. He said the same status should be given to the Secretary General of the UN as is given to the heads of the Bank and the Fund.

Prof. Welch did not favor a G20 and UN partnership. He said global governance is a tough challenge because there is simply no world government. He said the G20 is best at dealing with one set of issues, while the UN with another. He equated the two partnering as two different sports teams playing together. However, Prof. Welch favored sharing information, and there should not be the problem of the two working against one another due to a lack of information. The G20 and the UN each has its individual role, which is a good thing.

### **Closing Remarks**

Prof. Shinyo said it was great to have many thoughtful views from the panelists, and that everyone got a concrete idea for a nexus between the G20 and UN. Possibilities for a better reporting system from the G20 to the UN could be implemented, such as by using the high-level forum.

As a final note, Prof. Kirton responded to Prof. Welch’s example of mixing sports teams in comparison to the G20 and UN working together. He said that there is a consensus for some scope for synergy between the two. The G20 does not have any SDGs of its own, but it should go with the UN goals until it produces its own.

In the end, Prof. Shinyo closed the workshop by thanking the presenters, staff, and audience for attending.

# International Pre-G20 Summit Joint Workshop

by the G20 Research Group, the University of Toronto  
and  
The Integrated Center for UN and Foreign Affairs Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University

Time table <Tentative>		
Time	Program	Speaker*
10:00 – 10:05	Welcome Greetings	**
10:05 – 10:10	Opening Remarks	M
10:10 – 10:45	G20 Summit Performance, 2008-2018	F,O
10:45 – 11:00	Break	-
11:00 – 11:30	Putting Promises into Practice: Members Compliance with G20 Commitments	E,G,C
11:30 – 12:00	The G20 and UN's Role in Asian and Global Security	B,N
12:00 – 13:00	Break	-
13:00 – 14:10	Keynote Address: Japan's G20 Summit: Plans, Prospects & Possibilities	J,A,D
14:10 – 14:50	What's Wrong with Multilateralism: Revitalizing Liberal World Order	L,H,M
14:50 – 15:30	UN Challenges to 2030	J,I,L
15:30 – 15:40	Break	-
15:40 – 17:00	Panel Discussion: Prospects and Possibilities for G20-UN Partnership at Osaka	D,N,A,K,M
17:00 – 17:10	Closing Remarks	D,M
17:10	End of Conference	-

\* Alphabet refers the speakers on the following speakers list.

\*\* By President Murata, Osamu, Kwansei Gakuin University

## **Speakers** (Alphabetical order)

### **[JICA Institute]**

A) Ohno, Izumi (Director of JICA Research Institute, Japan)

### **[The University of Toronto]**

- B) Dragus, Aleksandra (Researcher, G20 Research Group)
- C) Han, Ji Yoon (Co-chair of the executive of summit studies for the G20 Research Group)
- D) Kirton, John (Director and founder of the G20 Research Group)
- E) Koch, Madeline (Executive director of the G20 Research Group)
- F) Ou, Cindy (Editor in Chief for the G20 Research Group)
- G) Warren, Brittaney (Director of Compliance Research and Lead Researcher for Climate Change and Environment for the G20)

### **[Kwansei Gakuin University]**

- H) Clugston, Mackenzie (Professor, Rector of Cross-Cultural College Program)
- I) Kukita, Jun (Chief Coordinator, KG Career Center for International Organizations, Visiting Professor)
- J) Mito, Takamichi (Professor, School of Law and Politics, Chief Academic Director of Cross-Cultural College Program)
- K) Murata, Shun-ichi (Dean, UN and Foreign Affairs Studies Program Office)
- L) Nishino, Keiko (Associate Dean, UN and Foreign Affairs Studies Program Office)
- M) Shinyo, Takahiro (Dean, Integrated Center for UN and Foreign Affairs Studies)

### **[University of Waterloo]**

N) Welch, David (Professor, Centre for International Governance Innovation Chair in Global Security)

### **[Soka University]**

O) Luckhurst, Jonathan (Associate Professor, The Graduate School of International Peace Studies)

