

# Subcontracting -cum- Outsourcing Filial Piety in Asia's Ageing Societies?

## Limits of the "Borrowed" Care in Cross-Border Flexible Labour Regime

オン・クオック・ライ

On-Kwok Lai

Confronting rapidly ageing population, some East Asia's (neoliberal) economies offer alternatives to preserve cultural virtues for filial piety (FP) duties by adopting a flexible regime of nomadic -importing guest- labours for domestic (not least family-care) work; Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong present such example. Foreign home helpers (FHH) for domestic works in middle-class families hence becomes unquestionably norm in these societies: over 331,000 FHH are working in Hong Kong, Singapore has its 231,000 domestic workers, whilst Taiwan employs around 219,000 FHH to serve the frail aged. More and more families are taking such practice to cope with the caring of their aged seniors, as well as promoting one's family's work-life balance! This arguably commercializing, sub-contracting -cum- outsourcing, of familial duties and domestic works is questionably considered as innovative, if not as the best alternative, in policy terms. Yet, this paper examines the embedded contradictions, tension and dynamics, of this flexible labour regime and its differential development in East Asia's ageing societies.

**Key Words :** Ageing Society, Domestic Workers, Filial Piety, Nursing Care, Policy Innovation

### 1. Ageing-Demographic Turn in Hyper-Modernizing Asia's Economic-Miracle

Demographic transitions in Asia's newly industrializing economies (NIEs: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, mainland China) are intertwined yet interacting with three distinct dynamics. Firstly, the hyper-modernizing demographic transitions towards ageing society; secondly the emerging regime of flexible (cross-border migrant-workers for domestic home helping or caring) labour market with more and more mobility of foreign home-helpers (FHH), and last but not least the (rejuvenation of the) thousand-year old social norms and virtues for filial piety (FP) – taking care of one's aged parents, in terms of inter-generation reciprocity (Ting 2009a/b, Lai 2007, 2013). To cope with the ageing challenges, the differential adaption of all three dynamic forces will shape the destiny of social development. Examine the developmental trend and dynamics, this paper addresses to the implications for elderly policy development and social innovation.

A new regime of transnational care is establishing

as flexible labour regime and income differentials in East Asia enable FHH to take care of the elderly -- due to (female) labour shortage and the preferred caring for the elderly at home. This seemingly attractive alternative option is also an extended form of filial piety (FP, respect and taking care of the seniors) sub-contracting that FHH serve for the aged 24-hour as they live-in, paralleling the round-the-clock global production regime. Socio-culturally, the *modus operandi* of "out-sourcing" and "sub-contracting" of traditional customs, particularly filial piety, confirms the socio-economic changes of family system in 21st Century Asia. FHH are one of the major the carriers for the (withering) cultural virtue of FP, yet they bear contradictions in hyper-modernizing Asia as well: migrant workers are at best are nomadic with minimal terms of social inclusion (-as outsider of the society); but FHH are indeed the "insider" of the family as they know the daily tasks of it – and in some instances they enable the socio-cultural norms (filial piety) re-making.

Asia's Confucian societies like the Greater China (of Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China), South Korea and Japan, have their common social

foundation yet with differentiated social virtues of filial piety – intergeneration and reciprocal care for the seniors. With no exception, these social values, norms and ethics have been differentially shaping and framing many public policies development, ranging from public housing provision and health services to family-based elderly care (Chang KS 2003, Lai 2007, Ting 2009b). But to what extent this new flexible labour regime for caring ageing population shapes social future of family relationship and reciprocities?

The hyper-modernizing economic miracle in the globalization project in the last three decades has been leading its demographic transitions; problematically manifesting as a global challenge due to the ageing momentum which is at its high speed in recent decades (Lai 2007, 2008a/b, 2013). To put ageing dynamism in its historical place, the United Nations estimates in 2007 (UNPD 2007) noted that the societal ageing ratio (percentage of those age 65 or above in the total population), in the developing countries, was a low at 6% in 2005, but was forecast to rise to 7.5% in 2020 and 14.6% in 2050.

The United Nations (2009) estimates confirm such trend: the elderly ratio was forecasted to double in around 30 years. According to the estimates, from 2009 to 2050, the number of persons aged 60 or over will grow almost to triple, globally, increasing from 739 million in 2009 to 2 billion by 2050. For the same period, a correspond increase from 65% to 79% of the world older person live in the less developed regions (U.N., 2009, p.x). Here, the demographic challenge is not only for the developed countries with a decline birth rate and prolonged longevity, but also for newly industrializing economies (NIEs) which follow a speedy rate of ageing trend in recent decades, East Asia in particular (Lai 2007, 2008a). China is one of such examples that, due to its one-child policy since 1979, it has over 12% of the population are aged 60 or above in 2009; but will gradually rise to 33% in 2050 (Xinhua News Agency, 4.July 2009).

In less than 30 years, demographic transitions occurred in Japan and all Asia's NIEs: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. These countries have been transformed from the high birth and death rate population model to a low birth rate (less than 1.5 in terms of Total Fertility Rate, TFR) and ageing one. Japan had 26% of the total population aged 65 or above, whilst Korea achieved 13% in 2015 (Birdsall, et.al. 2001; Rostow 2000; Lai 2007, 2008a; NIPSSR 2012, 2013, 2015).

Hyper-modernization goes along with hyper-urbanization processes, enhancing the individualization


of social development. The global ageing challenge, as stressed by the U.S. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS 2009), has a strategic significance for human survival if the problem is not probably dealt with. The critical problems for ageing society in developing economies are many, not least are the 'cash' – the financing (in terms of health care and pension system), the labour supply for caring services – the 'care' of the fragile aged (CSIS 2009, Jackson, et.al., 2009; see Fig.1).

Japan	26.8%	Italy	22%	Swiss	18%
Hong Kong	16%	Sweden	20%	U.K.	18%
Taiwan	12.5%	Germany	20%	Netherlands	18%
South Korea	13%	Norway	18%	USA	15%
China	10%	Spain	18.5%	Australia	15%
Singapore	12%	Austria	19%	Canada	16%
		France	18.5%		

(Source: the author's compilation from various sources from references of this paper).


**Fig.1: Asia in Global Ageing, 2015 (% of Population aged 65 or above)**

Compared with ageing process in the Western developed economies, demographic transitions began much later in East Asia than in the West (Mason and Kinugasa 2008), but the momentum is more dramatic with a hyper and speedy one (Lai 2008a, Tsuno and Hooma 2009). Historically, Japan led the post World War II rapid economic development in East Asia, from mid-1960s to 1980s, and later followed by South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1980s to 1990s. They are undoubtedly representatives of the phenomenal East Asian Economic Miracle, a term coined by the World Bank (World Bank 1993). The positive role of the baby boomers at the post World War II industrialization is important, supplying sufficient labour force for economic development; but the trend towards ageing is also historical, which will be likely repeated in other NIEs (See Fig.2 and Fig.3).



(Source: NIPSSR 2012)

**Fig.2: Demographic Challenges: Japan as Leading Prototype of Asia's Ageing Societies**



(Source: NIPRSS 2012)

**Fig.3: Japanese Advanced Ageing Society Challenges**

The demographic transitions in Japan (since 1960s), South Korea and Taiwan (since 1970s) towards ageing society have been very much due to natural growth – all three countries are a “closed” population system with minimal immigration (less than 1.5% of the population); China resembles such a closed system. Whilst the population systems in Hong Kong and Singapore are somewhat relatively “all open”, with large immigrants throughout the second half of 20th Century. In spite of the differences in the population systems, all economies experience demographic transitions towards ageing, with a decline of fertility and mortality (Mason and Kinugasa 2008).

More specific, hyper-modernization-driven demographic transitions towards ageing have strong impetus for socio-economic development. For example, South Korea’s population is rapidly ageing: in late 1990s, it was the youngest populations out of all OECD countries but by the middle 21st Century it will have one of the oldest, just behind Japan, Italy and Greece: in 2050, more than one-third of the population will be over the age of 65 and around half of all workers will be aged 50 and over (OECD 2016). Global ageing challenge is for every developed (and hyper-developing) economy. The destiny of any country depends on longevity: the demography driven demands to shape community and service market (Beck 2000; Milanovic 2003). As demographic transitions developed, there is, and will be, shortage of manpower to take care for the ageing family members; especially to fulfil the virtue of caring the aged in Asian familial-cultural ethos.

## 2. Remaking 2500-year Old Filial Piety in 21st Century Asia-Pacific?

In East Asia, Confucianism defines socio-cultural ideals for China, Korea and Japan in particular. One

of the key virtues of Confucianism is filial piety (FP) – taking care of the ageing parents in one’s life course. The obvious virtues are shown in the Chinese classics, the *Twenty-Four Paragon of Filial Piety*. Here, social reciprocity and familial loyalty, following Confucian norms, attribute to FP as both virtue and behaviours (Chow 2006, Meyer 2000).

The blood-tie foundation, coupling the sense of belonging and togetherness and the synergy of time, space and the upward oriented inter-generational social reciprocity, define FP. The most obvious, or the extreme manifestation / demonstration of FP, presents in funeral activities – customs, ritual and rule; yet the customization of funeral can easily move into a service industry. More specifically, funeral ceremony marks the end as well as the new beginning of FP (Lee 2003, Suzuki 2000).

Yet, there is a global trend of lowering fertility rate as rapid economic development: all Asian NIEs have been experiencing a significant drop of total fertility rate (TFR) to less than 1.5 per woman (K-S. Chang 2003, M-C.Chang 2004, Eu 2003, Golini 2003, Tu 2003, Yap 2003). Hence, the supply side of FP (sons and daughters) is sharply reduced following the drop of TFR. In this section, socio-economic familial changes will be discussed in relation to the FP practice – caring the elderly.

### 2.1 Intergenerational Caring as Work-Life Balance: Overloading or Burnt-Out?

Under economic liberalization, particularly for labour mobility in hyper-modernization, traditional role model for caring the aged within the realm of FP has its limits, if not withering away: a nationwide survey by the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1994 found that 60% of the care-givers thought their burden was too much. Furthermore, the ever-increasing demand for paid job performance and the service for family life are making heads of family (women in particular) overloading, if not burnt out; the burnt out tendency will be much increased if the duty of FP is included in the consideration.

This is in strong contrast to the early 1970s that women were willing to scarify for FP; Salaff (1995) has rightly pinpointed, and it has been well researched by feminist literature, that the downside of FP in Asian societies and family (in the case of Hong Kong) during industrialization era, has been exploiting the women’s life chance. To cope with external demands that the family members are differentially, gender-specific, exposed to the burden of responsibility, women (the never-married daughters and/or daughters-in-law) are mostly positioned

to bear the FP responsibility (Sung 2003, Zhan and Montgomery 2003). For Chinese patriarchy culture, which is contradictory in nature, women mostly have to be sacrificed for familial goals (Meyer 2000).

Under a more flexible, globalizing, production regime, workers have to moving into different localities for job and to engage in a 7-day-and-24-hour (7-24) working cycle – people are more nomadic yet less available for taking care of the ageing parents. More specific, the modern societal and economic demands for family (and its members) are more than ever under the conditions of labour market restructuring and uncertain economic outlooks. Women participation in economy becomes a norm yet this undermines the time-space arrangement for managing work-family life. Except family gifted by economic and cultural assets, most families in present economic conditions (ups and downs of business cycle) are under stress, though most families can still be functional but not healthy.

For younger generations, the modernist ideas of planning and choosing how to live one's life fit into the neo-liberal economics of consumer sovereignty: people have the idea that their own actions determine their own success or failure – definitely this orientation is exactly the spirits (ideology) of Asian Miracle and its instrumentalism for welfare development (Kwon 2005). But the built-in effect of this orientation is the repetitive planning (for better alternative choice) without the moral calling (have to get married and give birth) for actual experiencing the social reality on the one hand, and the procrastination of the social life-task (responsibility) in the name of continuing learning, life-long education – the biographization of life course (Vinken 2004; Mayer 2004). But all these shape the de-standardization of life course, developmental tasks and moral obligations that have not been taking up by younger generation – these are the inertia for those kid-adults to moving on to take up social (citizenship) responsibility, as well as the familial one of FP (Lai 2007).

More specific, global economic restructuring creates the sense of uncertainty, particularly in labour market: job insecurity and instability for people; particularly for the younger generation. This sense of uncertainty is paradoxically anchored with the ever-increasing calculative, rational planning for possible future work and familial engagements (FP against which job, where to live, with whom for courtship and marriage, etc.). The systematic planning future is not just affecting the younger one, the middle-age workers are called upon for retraining, as well as their continuing education (Beck 2000).

The upwardly mobile, better-off family (in

comparison with their previous cohort) dynamics reinforce the delaying and “exit” strategies of the younger generation not to take up socially expected role for adulthood, fatherhood / motherhood... as well as FP. Furthermore, the developmental state's further extension of higher education (postgraduate level), equal opportunities for men and women, and the promotion of progressive rights for women, also reinforce the personalized, individual choice for alternative life course. In short, the global system-demanded high mobility (working across-borders) and flexibility (working at home and off-hour over time work) of the labour is the embryo for disruptive family life course and cycle: late or never marriage, or no FP duties, reflecting the individualistic lifestyle orientation, as well as the lifestyle options-seeking and experimentation for both sexes; particularly the case for those who want to be ‘career’ woman than housewife.

## **2.2 Exchange-Pricing for Elderly Care: Short-Cut to, or Short-Circuit of, FP?**

Thanks to economic liberalization driven labour specialization and mobility, commercialization -cum- professionalization of nursing care for elderly seemingly is a way of FP sub-contracting – the role of carer shift from one's blood-tied family member or relative to the outsider of the family (see Lai 2007, Lan 2002 for discussion on sub-contracting and outsourcing of elderly care): the state funded welfare agencies sometimes reinforce this trend – perhaps the more extreme form is the so-called ‘Social Hospitalization’ (Lai 2001, 2007, Wu 2004, MHLW 2008, 2015).

Adjusting and adaptive to the ever-increasing care-burden (short cut to, and short-circuit) of FP will become a permanent feature of caring the aged, in our hyper-modern life course. In reality, professional care protocols (regulations on family member-visitors) are more often than not, unintentionally limit the extent of FP. Or, in its variations, professionalism legitimises a regime of FP sub-contracting; for instance, mobile-ambulance (day/time) caring regime in the so-called community caring regime. In short, the state intervention shapes the very different, mostly with unintended consequences, form of caring regime and therefore FP can be negotiable and adaptive, even following the logic of marketization (Lai 2007, Lan 2002). Distancing from their traditional role of familial carer, in a highly competitive society, women have to work and be independent – that is the new form of the (Western state) sponsored feminism. They gain money from paid work, and renegotiate

the caring role with the husband or their parents.... Yet, daughters-in-law turn to the employment of waged caregivers not only because of their shortage of time and to lessen the burdens of labour, but also to retrieve some autonomy from the authority of their mothers-in-law (Lan 2002, Kim et al. 1991, Kim and Kim 2003, Liu et al. 2000).

For caring the aging population, in Asian societies excepting Japan, migrating guest/foreign domestic labour is more than obvious. More recently, in Hong Kong, it is not uncommon that in private middle-class nursing home, foreign home helper (FHH), totally over 331,989 in 2015 (see Fig.4), are also assisting the more formal case, though the children and relatives of the aged do visit them regularly. And the trend for FHH home and elderly care is prevailing and likely to be part of the Hong Kong (middle class) family system; isn't it a new version of caring regime powered by mobile guest workers or out-sourcing and/or sub-contracting of elderly care?

	Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Others	Total
2005	118,030	96,900	4,510	3,760	223,200
2006	120,788	104,129	4,292	3,572	232,781
2007	123,545	114,411	4,072	3,503	245,531
2008	25,943	123,341	3,820	3,493	256,597
2009	129,875	130,448	3,858	3,597	267,778
2010	137,313	140,941	3,695	3,732	285,681
2015	173,726	150,000	4,000	4,263	331,989

(Source: Hong Kong Immigration Department)

**Fig.4: Estimated Foreign Domestic Helpers by Origin in Hong Kong, 2005-2015**

The caring *modus operandi* of the filial piety outsourcing and sub-contracting regime is seemingly functional and coupling with the state-advocated familism, which emphasizes on the quality of care and less-resources for better-quality of family life, in open (labour) market where efficiency and timeliness are the key for success. Yet, the adoption of FHH in family and/or community life is becoming a norm in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan; and for this, Japan is timely considering this option to cope with labour shortage in the long term care for ageing population.

### 3. Outsourcing Familial Duties with Flexible Regional Divisions of Labour

The (ideologically driven) neo-liberal global project, i.e., the creation of global free market and the dominance of Anglo-American capitalism within world's economic regions, has been cemented by networks of transnational corporations. In addition, free market capitalism is reinforced within the

frameworks of global economic institutions, like WTO, IMF, World Bank and G7, which enable the further deregulation, privatization, structural adjustment programs, and limited government. The globalization project is by default a regime of migrating (free flow of) labour supplies. But the globalization processes hence have put state-society at very peculiar position, as both exposed to the challenges of 'external' forces: capitals, goods, labour (and jobs) are more mobile than the previous regime of global order. Here, migrant labours become important for those (dirty) works not readily taken up local people.... This is particularly the case for the long-hour caring work tasks which require specific temporal locality-bound, in-situ (not transferable), *modus operandi* of service delivery: guest home helpers (domestic maids in the olden days)!

#### 3.1 The Borrowed Guest Work for Filial Piety in the "Care" Market?

To highlight the new *modus operandi* of caring the needy ageing population, we take the case of Taiwan as example in this section. The 2008 estimate for the aged (65 or above) population in Taiwan were 10% of the total population, with the long term nursing care service need for the ageing population is ca. 396,000 senior adults, and it is projected that in 2028, the aged (65 or above) population will reach 22.5% of the total population, with the nursing care needs of 811,000 elderly (*United Daily News*, 13.July 2009). The responsibility for caring the frail (396,000) aged persons is unequally divided by three major human labours, of the local (semi-)professional agencies (caring 50,000 elderly), 168,000 FHH-supported home stay and the family members' supported home stay for 180,000 aged persons. (*United Daily News*, 29.May 2009). The aged persons account for over 12.5% of Taiwan's population in 2015.

Since 1992, with the stringent regime for the certified nursing care needs by the health authority or professionals (very different from Hong Kong's "free-to-hire" model), the importation of guest nursing helper (the FHH equivalent) has been the major source (a form of FP out-sourcing) of human resources taking care of the fragile aged, and in 2008, the total numbers of FHH were 168,000. The latest migrant workers statistics available in June 2009 (see Fig.5) showed that out of the total 335,665 migrants population, the (mostly female) nursing care workers accounted for 172,393, with the majority origins from Indonesia (117,200), Vietnam (31,000) and the Philippines (22,400).


But the quality of elderly nursing care by the FHH has been questioned, that those aged with FHH care have high prevalence for hospital admission and poorer quality of health (*United Daily News*, 31.May 2009).

	November 2007	November 2008	June 2009
<b>Caregivers/Maids</b>	<b>162,472</b>	<b>168,313</b>	<b>172,393</b>
Indonesia	62%	66%	68%
Vietnam	22%	20%	18%
Philippines	15%	14%	13%
Thailand	1%	1%	1%
<b>Manufacturing Workers</b>	<b>162,813</b>	<b>194,052</b>	<b>150,720</b>
Indonesia	8%	7%	8%
Vietnam	18%	25%	20%
Philippines	33%	31%	28%
Thailand	43%	37%	36%
<b>Construction Workers</b>	<b>0,696</b>	<b>6,308</b>	<b>4,544</b>
Indonesia	1%	1%	1%
Vietnam	9%	10%	12%
Philippines	7%	4%	3%
Thailand	84%	85%	84%

Source: Taiwan Council of Labor Affairs.  
(Source: Fix et al. 2009, p.55 )

**Fig.5: Guest Worker Permits Issued by Taiwan: Industries by Countries Origins, 2007-2009**

But on the other hand, the labour rights of the guest workers are not protected within the labour law in Taiwan – their official social rights are minimally attached to the norms of labour market. This neglect of, or the abuse on, guest workers are among hosting societies in Asia (Law 2002, Lyons 2005). Hence, they are the sub-classes of semi-normal citizenship in their host countries. More critically and in spite of the global recession which has stopped the inflow of guest workers to Taiwan, the demand for guest migrants-embedded nursing care for ageing population has never been matched, and the trend for increasing migrant nursing care worker from overseas is more than prevalent (see Fig.6).




Source: Taiwan Council of Labor Affairs.  
(Source: Fix et al. 2009, p.54)

**Fig.6: Work Permits issued to Foreign Workers in Taiwan, 2007- 2009**

### 3.2 Globalization-driven Social Nomadic Sub-Classes Formation

According to International Labour Organization’s study (ILO 2013), there are at least 52 million people around the world, with majority of them are women (89%), working as domestic workers (our terms of FHH). But these mass migrant labours have been exploited severely in terms of: 29.9% of them are excluded from national labour legislation, 45% have no entitlement to weekly paid leave or paid annual leave, and over one-third of them have no maternity protection, and majority of those “live-in” maids work over 67-hour per week (see Fig.7). In Asia-Pacific alone, over 21.5 million domestic workers are employed, with majority (81.4%) are women – this reflects a “genderization” of migrant workers flow differentiated along or between construction work undertaken by men and domestic work by female labours (ILO 2013: 28). The new nomadic sub-classes, represented by migrant workers, are embedded in the globalization project for further economic liberalization.



(Source: ILO 2013 )

**Fig.7: Global Distribution of Domestic Workers by Sex and Region, 2010**

Under globalization, there is emerging, developing into permanence, of social sub-classes derived from nomadic flow of people, migrant-workers for domestic work, across borders. Welfare rights in the Western (welfare states) have been much theoretically anchored upon T.H.Marshall’s concept of social rights – an extended, 20th century capitalist state financed basic welfare provisions, yet integrated part of citizenship rights from civil and political rights won in the 18th and 19th centuries (Holmwood 2000). The fully developed welfare state in the post-war era highlights the state’s project for full social protection against developmental risks of human society: constituting nationhood with people solidarity – the very notion of citizenship -cum- social

contract, within a closed system of the nation state's population and territorial bound socio-economic development.

On the other hand, the East Asia Miracle demonstrates the alternative to social development that socio-economic progress with people's loyalty and hope for the future – the legitimacy of the governing state, can be derived from the economic contract for "free choice" without a fully developed social (welfare) citizenship regime. Hence welfare citizenship could be decoupled from the labour market social contracting, as long as social contract(s) between the labour (workers) and capital (the firms / government as employer) can work-out economic efficiency in the 'compressed' hyper-modernization (Chiu and So 2005, Paehlke 2003).

Under economic liberalization, the globalization forces reinforce the momentum of labour mobility, the higher rate of globalization links to: the higher rate for both legal and illegal migrants, as well the migrant-workers; and the higher will be the socio-economic disparity and differential in one locality. How to cope with this heterogeneous yet mixed category of the nomads-of-globalization, the newly 'borrowed' sub-citizenship of globalization (minorities? ethnic groups? people-in-transits?), within and beyond the territorial boundary of nation/local state, is a critical social policy challenge (Fix, et.al. 2009; Sainsbury 2012). But traditional networks and families expose to hyper-modernization demands. Under global labour market restructuring, the unsecured tenure for labour class has exerted tremendous pressure on family system – families under high growth economies have been stretched to their limits for caring those family members with special care, where families are heavily 'taxed' by home mortgage and oligarchic retailing networks.

In reality, lower class and socio-economic deprived migrants are discriminated against not just by their host communities, but also by the systematic neglects (sometime even policy targeting) of the government. In mainland China, over billions of migrant workers lack the parity of living chance, vis-à-vis their counterparts of normal residents with normal household registration in cities; over 331,000 migrant domestic helpers from Southeast Asia working in Hong Kong's families lack adequate social protection, and over 219,000 of migrant domestic nursing-care workers in Taiwan have been problematically surviving.

In East Asia, majority of the female migrant-workers are for domestic work: FHH move from Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines to the Middle East, Hong Kong and Singapore. Many

also come from Myanmar and Cambodia to work in Thailand, but these are largely illegal. Employed in private households 7 day-24 hour (7-24 working mode), these women are lack of normal basic labour rights, deprived of socio-cultural and welfare rights (of social citizenship) and can be very isolated and vulnerable (Stalker 2008; Piper 2008, Ed., 2008). How to integrate these mobile and sub-classes of nomad domestic workers (FHH) in the hosting societies needs to be addressed not just in social (security and inclusion) citizenship terms but also in terms of human rights (ILO 2013, Lai 2007, 2011, 2013).

#### **4. Policy Innovations in Nomadic-Flexible Labour Regime**

The discussion above highlights the contradictions of the hyper-modernizing, rapidly ageing, Asia-Pacific and the differential caring regime, human resourced by flexible migrant (predominantly female) workers. FHH are enabling some form of the assisted ageing with care – isn't towards a rejuvenated regime of filial piety? But to what extent can nomadic-flexible migrant labour force shape global ageing future? A critical ending remark to public policy innovations, though often lag behind reality, is provided here.

##### **4.1 Interfacing Policy Innovation and Social Norms in/beyond Asia-Pacific**

The trilogy of Asia's developmental dynamics – of the hyper-modernization driven demographic lowering fertility and ageing, with a flexible regime of migrant domestic helpers (FHH) and the partially rejuvenated, or the rediscovery, of Confucian filial piety of inter-generational socio-familial reciprocities to caring the seniors and the aged, will likely shape East Asian societies' destiny in 21st Century. But before any specific policy initiative to taking on the comparative (dis-)advantages of these developing-trendy offerings, there is an urgent need to recognize, as well as to make sense of, the social reality we are in – all these are relevant for the policy initiatives and social innovations.

Socio-culturally, the *modus operandi* of the "outsourcing" (from the family member to other non-family member) and "sub-contracting" (the FHH employing agencies and family members downward sub-contracting to the individual FHH) of the traditional custom, filial piety (FP, respect and taking care of the seniors), confirms the change of home care regime in 21st Century (see Lan 2002 and Lai

2007 for detail discussion). FHH in actuality are one of the main carriers for the (withering) cultural virtue of FP, but they are paradoxically as outsiders of the host family and at best a nomadic social sub-class or under-class (vis-à-vis T.H.Marshall's concept of social citizenship), without welfare rights.

But the demand for guest workers' FP-compatible job performance is contradictory to their nomadic social (sub-)citizenship status (having minimal social inclusion) – FHH are both outsiders (for the hosting family and country) and insiders (working 7 day-24 hour [7-24] within the host family and performing FP duties as if they were the daughter or daughter-in-law) for the socio-cultural norms making! All these have been reinforcing the contradictions within the East Asian family system based upon FP, and exacerbating the problems of exploitation due to 7-24 caring the aged – but FHH have no compatible or equitable economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights. Hence, human rights at large for migrant-labours in hyper-modernizing Asian societies are not protected (Piper, Ed. 2008).

Obviously, the most important approach for public policy planning and social innovations in the coming years is to bring back, and to re-examine, the case of FHH and their nomadic labour regime, say the least to recognize their (gender and inter-generational) role so far for societal-family development: how they fit into different policy development scenarios to cope with the challenges of rapidly ageing population. Up to now, not many policy studies (on housing, children education, family friendly, health care, welfare and elderly alike) have touch upon the several decades existence of 800,000-plus migrant-workers offering domestic maid service-care in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan: though they are almost everywhere in health care clinics and hospitals, nursing homes and outside the schools... all importantly “accompany” the aged, children and women, family at large. And more importantly, they provide a supportive role for the so-called gender-equality (for the best possible opportunities and achievement for women) in differential East Asia's socio-economic miracle. This reality-check is indeed just a small step towards the so-called (which might be so popularly over-discussed among policy science professionals and politicians) “evidence-based and informed policy making”. In actuality, it is great surprising that we (and you) cannot find any existence, hence any role, of such a large women power residing and working 7-24 in several hundred thousand families, in any (both before and after the 2000s) Asia's government policy papers, executive orders, directives and guidelines. For this, recent

policy research initiatives on *Filial Piety* (Lai 2013, Ting 2009a/b) are rightly re-addressing the (main supportive) role of FHH in family-society differential functioning in hyper-modernizing societies; this contributes to Asia-Pacific policy agenda-setting and evolution, as well as social innovations, for the benefits of ageing population at large.


**4.2 The Sub-Contracting of Filial Piety: The Outsider-(as Insider)-“Care”**

The elderly care in Asia's NIEs is a 7-24 caring service industry, mostly staffed by low-paid female workers and/or the FHH. This is within the context of the regional labour migration that the capacity of caring service is substantially upgraded with a new regime of elderly care out-sourcing / sub-contracting and mobile labour force: it seems that nursing home in Hong Kong and Taiwan, if granted more flexibility for guest labour (co-nursing FHH workers), their experimentation will give insights for Japanese and other societies to learn for coping with their ageing population (See Fig.8, Fig.9).

Country and region	Labour force			Outflow of foreign workers					Outflow of national workers					Immigrants working abroad				
	1997	2000	1997	2002	2006	1997	2002	2006	1997	2001	2005	1997	2001	2006	1997	2001	2006	1997
Japan	46,084	41,665	87,870	141	135	94	51	51	780	715	680	181	43	124				
Korea	12,186	11,270	22,666	17	22	202	231	227	379	288	216							
China	760,761	769,270	769,284			770	426	334				40	42					
Hong Kong	1,066	1,070	2,216	285	20	14			1277	217	175							
Taiwan	10,678	9,784	19,210						194	371	1210							
Singapore	2,192	2,192	1,870						180	180	180	180						
Indonesia	10,241	8,616	9,948	713					1,183	880	1,172				1,000	1,000		
Thailand	10,212	11,473	11,242	101	48	118	131	134	1,007	1,101	805							
Burma	140,618	91,411	91,272	21	12	21	480	481	477	171	31	15	3,004					
Philippines	11,170	10,918	10,281						117								1,000	1,000
Visitors	14,100	10,443	473						101									

(Source: METI 2005, p.461)

**Fig.8: Labour Migration in East Asia, 1997-2003**



Source: National agencies in each country in charge of overseas workers' deployment. (Abella and Ducanes, 2009, p.2)

**Fig.9: Annual Outflows of Migrant Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 1997-2008**

The Japan's trade talks with South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines



for Free Trade Agreement (FTA) highlights the trend toward a more mobile labour regime for nursing care workers: a few thousands caring workers are planned for elderly care policy experiment. More specifically, Japan wants the Philippines to give greater investment and services trade opportunities to Japanese businesses in the FTA, while the Philippines wants Japan's job market opened to Filipino nurses and lawyers. For Thailand, to lower tariffs on Japanese auto parts, and Bangkok's insistence that Japan open its markets to Thai rice, chicken and other agricultural products, and to ease its foreign labour rules so Thai physical therapists can work in Japan. In actuality, around a few thousands guest nursing care workers from Indonesia, Thai and the Philippines are now in training in Japan -- the importance of guest professionals, para-professionals and guest home helpers are more than obviously demanded by ageing society. Coping with ageing population in East Asia, the regime of flexible nursing or home-helping labour migration is establishing; though it cannot solve the fundamental shortage of local nursing worker supplies (say the shortfall is nearly half a million in Japan).

From the supply side of migrant workers, we can also see paralleling trend of the importance of female ones in the overall migrant-workers' mobility (see Fig.10). Recent migration studies also show the feminization of migration in Asia region (Piper 2008, Ed., 2008; Yamanaka and Piper 2006). Hence, the female guest workers tend to assume the socio-cultural role of caring agency not just within the familial boundaries, but also extending to the cross-borders trading and commercialized transaction of filial piety.

Country	Outgoing Workers (in 000s)	Percentage of Women (%)
Philippines	1070	59
Indonesia	593	69
Sri Lanka	204	57
Vietnam	79	57

(Source: adapted from Stalker 2008, p.9 and p.12)

**Fig.10: Outflow of (Migrant-)Workers and Percentage of Women, 2007**

For the flexible, nomadic labour regime in Asia, three obvious issues need to be addressed. Firstly, the pro-family policy re-orientation should not be targeting to the individuals and families by various types of high profile campaign (using mass media and hence wasting people's time and resource to entertain such events), but we should change the policy and business practice that will enable more freedom and time for family members to interacting

among themselves: work-life balance in terms of inter-generational care is crucial for socio-familial development.

Secondly, global ageing is a challenge for every developed economy. We have shown that the backside of active FP might produce the burnt-out of caregivers, which is prompting to elderly abuse (Yan and Tang 2003). With the demographic trends of fewer children and ageing population, coupled with the economic problems in East Asia is experiencing, attitudes toward supporting elderly parents and aged relatives are also changing significantly. It is becoming increasingly difficult to expect that families will provide full support for their elderly, and the problems of illness and long-term care have been identified as the greatest concern of the elderly (Lai 2001, 2008a/b; cf. Ornatowski 1996).

Last but not least, it is not just the disparity of life chance between the rural and urban sector, between the rich and the poor; but also the de-humanization of work, the disharmony (if not conflicts) between work-family life. To cope with the overwhelming demands for caring both the young and older generations by the working class, public policy should re-orientate itself towards an intergenerational care friendly one: the enabling of FP and parental duties, by granting FP leaves at work place; these are some possible initiatives.

As a social virtue, many Asians (even Westerner) support the filial (piety) duty. But in a turbulent reality of flexible production regime, a mixing of work-and-family life, as well as the nomadic life experience for job (insecurity) and survival, the individual's contribution to FP is quite another thing – all these are contextually negotiated in the de-standardized life course. On the other hand, the ageing population (the more educated one, like us) is seemingly, fatalistically yet realistically, accepting the non-FP reciprocity and they (we in future) do not expect nor blame much about non-fulfilment of filial duty (K-S Chang 2003, cf. Hwang 1999, Jang et al. 2000).

To recapitulate, the new regional labour migration regime enables the shifting of FP burden (who and where to take care of the parents, how and how much?) from the blood-tie and familial one to foreign guest workers, FHH. In actuality, the change of labour regime is being championed by regional and international governmental bodies like WTO and IMF, for the globalization project. But the liberalized flexible labour regime offers no basic human (economic, social and cultural) rights (minimal social rights) for migrant workers at large.

### 4.3 Nomadic-Labour Regime: Borrowed Home-Care Opportunism with Curse?


Historically, the ageing rate for doubling of the elderly ratio (from 7% of the total population age 65 or above) used to occur at a steady pace. In the developed countries, it took 105 years in France, 85 years in Sweden, but in Japan, only 24 years. The Japanese case is in fact the fore-runner for Asian newly industrializing economies, like South Korea (Eu 2003), Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as the rapidly ageing China (after 2030). The Asian Miracle highlights a “compressed” hyper-modernization yet differential development mode, which drives speedy demographic transitions, ageing process at large.

The transformation process for society (upon individual family) is unprecedented. Comparative studies have shown that the paradox of cultural virtues, say, filial piety (FP), might produce the burnt-out of caregivers (Sung 2003), which is prompting to elderly abuse (Yan and Tang 2003; Lai 2007). Distancing from their traditional role of familial carer, in a highly competitive society, women have to work and be independent – that is the new form of the (Western state) sponsored feminism. They gain money from paid work, and renegotiate the caring role with the husband or their parents. Yet, daughters-in-law turn to the employment of waged caregivers not only because of their shortage of time and to lessen the burdens of labour, but also to retrieve some autonomy from the authority of their mothers-in-law (Lan 2002, Kim et al. 1991, Kim and Kim 2003, Lai 2007, Liu et al. 2000).

For caring the aging population, in Asian societies excepting Japan, the use of guest/foreign domestic labour is more than obvious. The caring *modus operandi* for out-sourcing and sub-contracting regime is seemingly functional and coupling with the state-advocated familism, which emphasizes on the quality of care and less-resources for better-quality of family life, in open (labour) market where efficiency and timeliness are the key for success. Yet, the adoption of FHH working 7-24 in family and/or community life is becoming a norm. More recently, in Hong Kong, it is not uncommon that in private middle-class nursing home, FHH are also assisting the established professionals like social workers and nurses, to perform some basic yet important tasks of nursing care. Their caring role is more than materialist or behaviourist per se; emotional supports for the aged ones are not uncommon: isn't it a new version of caring regime powered by FHH for elderly care?

Under economic liberalization regime and high mobility capital, labour and goods, labour force

can be mobile, flexible and adaptive not just to the manufacturing of goods, but also helping to caring the aged as a form of service-for-foreign-currencies (an out-sourcing of FP for elderly care). Recently, the remittances from guest workers overseas back home are important for the local development; this is particularly the case for Asian migrant workers' exporting countries, like Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam (Fix, et.al. 2009; Piper 2009; see Fig.11).



(Source: Abella and Ducanes, 2009, p.7).

**Fig.11: Asian Migrant Workers' Remittances to Countries of Origins; 2001-2008**

In spite of the fact that the ideal for filial piety is not practical in a turbulent reality of flexible production regime, against the compressing work-and-family life of the nomadic life experience for (most of us are some form of) migrant workers, various studies on the so-called sojourns' mobile communication, using mobile phone for cross-border yet intra-familial communication, highlight the liberating aspect of the benefits of being in the information age: in what P-C. Lan (2006) describes as the global Cinderella with a mobile phone. The icon of the nomadic Cinderella represents migrant workers' mobile communication with their distant family members in the information age.

Who care for those FHH's aged parents? Through mobile phone, migrant workers can enjoy not just inter-generational communication, but also the encrypted informative instruction texting for managing family wealth; the (instruction and the digital proof for) remittance of fund back to the home becomes a way of life (Migrant Remittances 2005).

As world remittance market is having exponentially growth with flexible global workforces recently, coupled with the ever-increasing mobile phone user by migrant workers, Vodafone and Citigroup launch a Vodafone-branded mobile-based international money transfer service targeting the global remittance market worldwide. (Citigroup 2007). The new (sojourns-targeted)

service provides senders and receivers of money with a simple, easy to use, secure, transparent and convenient method for sending money home with mobile phone or via the internet. Hence this new sojourn experience and mobile communication practice can, and will, enable their elders or parents to be readily ageing-in-place, with both communicative and financial supports from remote distance relatives.

To recapitulate, the contradictions in new transnational labour regime of 7 day-24 hour home caring services provided by outsiders (guest workers)-as-insiders, following new FP practices, is contradictory and problematic: when one society's virtues (say FP) become the transnational curse for guest (outsider-as-insider) workers, are not these social virtues still worth to be pursued? The present welfare sub-classification of, or in some cases discrimination against, guest workers (FHH) is more than obvious; not a fair and just regime for migrant workers' economic, social and cultural rights as globally recognized by international communities, nor in accordance with basic human rights.

For individuals, the living chance of living in one's own local communities is contingent upon the ups-and-downs of global business cycle, with a flexible regime of labour productivity and mobility.... Here, younger people having no choice but are more nomadic and mobile for paid job anywhere and anytime, whilst the aged one is mostly yet reluctantly community-bound and locality-fixated. All these are likely shaping social-familial changes, challenging the very basic ideas of good virtue and customs (say, filial piety) of familial and inter-generational reciprocity in one's own family-community (Hwang 1999, Meyer 2000). For ageing population, they are structurally linked to, yet uneasily bound by, the rapid industrialization, mega-urbanization and hyper-modernization, at a compressed time-frame. Still, caring the aged is a challenge, unfinished project, for all people in 21st Century!

**Acknowledgement:** This is derived from a decade-long (2001-2014) project on Sustainable Welfare in Global Ageing Society, generously funded by Kwansai Gakuin University, with Honorary Professorship at Department of Social Work & Social Administration, The University of Hong Kong and Visiting Professorship at United Nations University – Institute of Advanced Studies. Part of this paper was presented at Hong Kong Asian Studies Association Conference, 8-9 March 2013, and published as Lai (2010, 2013). It is dedicated to the author's mother for her ageing-teaching. The normal disclaimers apply. Comments are welcome: [oklai@kwansai.ac.jp](mailto:oklai@kwansai.ac.jp)

## REFERENCES

- Abella, Manolo and Geoffrey Ducaes (2009). The Effect of the Global Economic Crisis on Asian Migrant Workers and Governments' Responses Summary of Presentations for the Impact of the Economic Crisis on Labour Migration in Asia in the ILO/SMC Workshop on Building a Comparable, Up-to-date, and Sustainable Database on Labour Migration held in Manila on 21-22 January 2009.
- Beck, Ulrich (2000). *What is Globalization?* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Birdsall, N., Kelly, A.C. and Sinding, S.W. (eds.) (2001) *Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth and Poverty in the Developing World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 2009), Report on Global Ageing, <http://csis.org/program/global-aging-initiative>, retrieved on 23.September 2009.
- Chang, Kyung-Sup (2003). The State and Families in South Korea's Compressed Fertility Transition: A Time for Policy Reversal? *Journal of Population and Social Security (Population)*, supplement to Volume 1(June): 596-610.
- Chang, Ming-Cheng (2003). Demographic Transition in Taiwan. *Journal of Population and Social Security (Population)*, supplement to Volume 1 (June): 611-628.
- Chiu, Stephen W.K. and Alvin Y. So. (2005) Flexible Production and Industrial Restructuring in Hong Kong: From Boom to Bust? In: Gilbert Gonzalez (Eds.), *Labor, Race, and Empire*. London: Routledge
- Chow, N. (2006). The practice of filial piety and its impact on long-term care policies for elderly people in Asian Chinese communities, *Asian Journal of Gerontology & Geriatrics*, 1(1):31-35.
- Citigroup (12.February 2007), Press Release on Vodafone and Citigroup announce Worldwide Mobile Financial Remittance Venture. Retrieved on 2.August 2008: <<http://www.sendmoneyhome.org/uploads/2007/02/vodafone-citigroup-partnership-final.pdf>>
- Economist*, various dates, online: <http://www.economist.com>
- Eurostat (2016). *Eurostat: Population Structure and Ageing*, accessed on 25.April 2016: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population\\_structure\\_and\\_ageing](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing)
- Eu, Ki-Soo (2003). Understanding Recent Fertility Decline in Korea. *Journal of Population and Social Security(Population)*, supplement to Volume 1(June): 574--595.
- Fix, Michael, D.G. Papademetriou, J.Batalova, A.Terrazas, Serena Y-Y Lin, and M. Mittelstadt (2009). *Migration and the Global Recession - A Report Commissioned by the BBC World Service*. Washington., D.C. Migration Policy Institute.
- Golini, Antonio (2003). Low Fertility and Policy Responses in some Developed Countries. *Journal of Population and Social Security (Population)*, supplement to Volume 1(June): 446-475.

- Hwang, K. (1999). Filial Piety and Loyalty: Two Types of Social Identification in Confucianism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 2(1), 163-183.
- International Labour Organization (ILO 2013). *Domestic Workers across the World*. Geneva: ILO.
- Jackson, Richard, Keishuka Nakashima and Neil Howe (2009) *China's Long March to Retirement Reform*. Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies
- Jang, Y., Haley, W. E., and Reynolds, S.L.(2000). Mutual Exchange of Support and Inter-generational Relationships in Korean Families. *Hallym International Journal of Aging*, 2(2), 135-147.
- Kim, I. K., and Kim, C.(2003). Patterns of Family Support and the Quality of Life of the Elderly. *Social Indicators Research*, 62-63, 437-454.
- Kim, K. C., Kim, S., Hurh, W. M.(1991). Filial Piety and Intergenerational Relationship in Korean Immigrant Families. *International Journal of Aging and Human Development*, 33(3), 233-245.
- Kwon, Huck-Ju (2005). Transforming the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia. *UNRISD Social Policy and Development Programme Paper No.22*, September 2005. Geneva: UNRISD.
- Lai, On-Kwok (2001). Long Term Care Policy Reform in Japan. *Journal of Aging and Social Policy*, 13 (2&3): 5-20.
- Lai, On-Kwok (2007). Family Consequences of Economic Miracle and Hyper-Modernization: Dynamics of Inter-Generational Reciprocity in Aging Japan and Beyond; *International Journal of Sociology of the Family*, 2007(1/Spring): 95-122.
- Lai, On-Kwok (2008a). The Enigma of Japanese Ageing-in-Place Practice in the Information Age: Does Digital Gadget Help the (Good) Practice for Inter-Generation Care? *Ageing International*. 32: 236-255.
- Lai, On-Kwok (2008b). Locating the Missing Links of Mobile Communication in Japan: Socio-Cultural Influences on Uses for Children and Elderly. In: James E. Katz (ed.), *Handbook of Mobile Communication Studies*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lai, On-Kwok (2010) Mobile to Work but Stuck at the Host Family – Enigma of Transnational Home Helpers, *Journal of Policy Studies* (No.36, Nov. 2010) 36: 19-36.
- Lai, On-Kwok (2013). Transnational Sub-contracting of Filial Piety in East Asia Ageing Societies. *Public Administration and Policy – an Asia Pacific Journal*. 16(2): 50-67.
- Lan, Pei-Chia. (2002). Subcontracting Filial Piety: Elder Care in Ethnic Chinese Immigrant Families in California. *Journal of Family Issues*, 23(7), 812-835.
- Lan, Pei-Chia (2006). *Global Cinderella: Migrant Domestic and the Newly Rich Employers in Taiwan*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Law, Lisa. 2002. Sites of transnational activism—Filipino non-governmental organizations in Hong Kong. In Brenda Yeoh, E. Teo & S. Huang (eds.), *Gender Politics in the Asia Pacific Region*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, S. (2003). Managing 'Face,' Hygiene and Convenience at a Chinese Funeral in Singapore. *Mortality*, 8(1), 48-66.
- Liu, J. H., Ng, S. H., Weatherall, A., and Loong, C.(2000). Filial Piety, Acculturation, and Intergenerational Communication among New Zealand Chinese. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 22(3), 213-223.
- Lyons, Lenore (2005). Transient workers count too? The intersection of citizenship and gender in Singapore's civil society, *Sojourn*, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 208–248.
- Mason, A. and Kinugasa T. (2008) East Asia Economic Development: Two Demographic Dividends, *Journal of Asian Economics*, 19, pp. 389-399.
- Mayer, Karl U. (2004). Life Course and Life Chances in a Comparative Perspective. pdf from website of Yale University Centre for Research on Inequalities and Life Course (CIQLE): <http://www.yale.edu/socdept/CIQLE/CIQLE%20papers/mayer,%20Life%20Courses%20and%20Life%20Chances.pdf>
- Meyer, J. F. (2000). Concord and Conflict from a Confucian Perspective: The Paradigm of the Family. *Research in Human Social Conflict*, 2, 59-79.
- Migrant Remittances (2005), Beam It Across; Remittances via Mobile Phones, Migrant Remittances, April (2/1). Retrieved on 2.August 2008: <[http://www.remittances.info/RemitAMAP3\\_05.pdf](http://www.remittances.info/RemitAMAP3_05.pdf) >
- Milanovic, Branko (2003). The Two Faces of Globalization: Against Globalization as We Know It. *World Development*, 31(4): 667-683.
- Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, 2005). *White Paper on International Economy and Trade*. Tokyo: METI.
- Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW, 2008), *White Paper on the Elderly (高齢社会白書)*. Tokyo: MHLW.
- Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW, 2015), *White Paper on the Elderly (高齢社会白書)*. Tokyo: MHLW.
- National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan (NIPSSR, 2012) *Population Statistics of Japan 2011*, <http://www.ipss.go.jp/>
- National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan (NIPSSR, 2013) *Population Statistics of Japan 2012*, <http://www.ipss.go.jp/>
- National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan (NIPSSR, 2015) *Population Statistics of Japan 2014*, <http://www.ipss.go.jp/>
- NHK News, various dates and times.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2016) *Working Better with Age: Korea*. Paris: OECD
- Ornatowski, G. K.(1996). Confucian Ethics and Economic Development: A Study of the Adaptation of Confucian Values to Modern Japanese Economic Ideology and Institutions. *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 25(5), 571-590.
- Piper, Nicola (2008). Feminization of migration in Asia and the social dimensions of development. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 7, pp. 1287–1303.
- Piper, Nicola (Ed., 2008). *New Perspectives on Gender and Migration—Rights, Entitlements and Livelihoods*. London: Routledge.

- Piper, Nicola (2009). Editorial introduction: The complex interconnections of the migration-development nexus—A social perspective. *Population, Space and Place*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 93–101.
- Rostow, W.W. (2000) Modern Japan's fourth challenge: The Political Economy of Stagnant Population, *The Japanese Economic Review*, 51(3), pp. 297-307.
- Sainsbury, Diane (2012). *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Salaff, Janet W. (1995). *Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety of Power in the Family*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Stalker, Peter (2008) Protecting Migrant Workers: Governance of Labour Migration in Asia and the Pacific. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
- Sung, S.(2003). Women reconciling Paid and unpaid Work in a Confucian Welfare State: The Case of South Korea. *Social Policy and Administration*, 37(4), 342-360.
- Suzuki, Hirkau.(2000). *The Price of Death*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- The Economist*, various dates, online: <http://www.economist.com>
- The Economist* (2009). A Special Report on Ageing Population. 27 June 2009.
- The Japan Times*, various dates.
- Ting, Kwok Fai (2009a). *A Review of the Research Literature on Filial Piety*. Commissioned Report, The Central Policy Unit, Hong Kong SAR Government (CPU-HKSAR). Hong Kong: CPU-HKSAR
- Ting, Kwok Fai (2009b) *The Meaning and Practice of Filial Piety in Hong Kong*. Commissioned Report, The Central Policy Unit, Hong Kong SAR Government (CPU-HKSAR). Hong Kong: CPU-HKSAR: [http://www.cpu.gov.hk/doc/en/research\\_reports/Filial%20Piety.pdf](http://www.cpu.gov.hk/doc/en/research_reports/Filial%20Piety.pdf)
- Tu, Edward Jow-Ching (2003). Patterns of Lowest-Low Fertility in Hong Kong. *Journal of Population and Social Security (Population)*, supplement to Volume 1(June):.629-642.
- United Nations (U.N., 2009) *World Population Prospects*. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations Population Division (UNPD, 2007). *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database*. New York: UNPD.
- Vinken, Henk (2004). Changing Life Courses of Young Generations across Cultures. *School of Sociology and Social Work Journal – Kwansai Gakuin University*, 2004(79): 119-139.
- World Bank (1993) *The East Asian Miracle*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wu, Yongmei (2004). *The Care of the Elderly in Japan*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Yamanaka, Keiko and Nicola Piper. (2006). Feminised Migration in East and Southeast Asia: Policies, Actions and Empowerment. UNRISD Occasional Paper No. 11. UNRISD, Geneva.
- Yan, Elsie, and Tang, C.S. (2003). Proclivity to Elder Abuse: A Community Study on Hong Kong Chinese. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 18(9): 999-1017.
- Yap, Mui Teng. (2003). Fertility and Population Policy: the Singaporean Experience. *Journal of Population and Social Security (Population)*, supplement to Volume 1(June): 643-658.
- Zhan, H. J. and Montgomery, R. J. V.(2003). Gender and Elder Care in China: The Influence of Filial Piety and Structural Constraints. *Gender & Society*, 17(2), 209-229.