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Deliberations Over Citizenship and Japanese Citizenship*

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Introduction

Citizenship and ideas about being a citizen in Western discourse can be traced back to the ancient Greeks and Romans. The concept of citizen was reconfigured during the rise of the nation state in the 18th and early 19th centuries, but it remained stable until the mid-1990s at which time, “there has been an explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship . . .” (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 352). The academic literature on citizenship has grown with “overwhelming urgency” at a “breathtaking pace” making it “a true phenomenon of our time” (Somers 2008: 12, 148). As Staeheli, Marshall and Maynard (2016: 377) observed, “the academic literature on citizenship reveals it as a complex, multivalent concept.” As attention intensified, the scope, content and depth of the concept was “redefined and reconfigured” (Isin and Turner 2002: 2) to such an extent that citizenship had been “overworked” and become “a more confounding concept than most who employ the term would usually recognize” (Bosniak, 2006: 1). As scholars debated and elaborated upon citizenship, misunderstandings and confusion often appeared. Whatever initiated the recent flurry of attention (e.g., globalization, decline of the nation state, rise of non-state movements), citizenship no longer has a single, widely accepted definition.

I first review the citizenship debates that arose in a Western context and identify six issues they raise. Next, I consider how each issue applies to the contemporary Japanese situation. Although Japanese citizenship evolved from early Meiji through the Imperial era and was reconfigured under the U.S. occupation, the issues of civil society participation, immigration and minority inclusion at the turn of the 21st century have stimulated new deliberations. Significant parallels exist between the central issues in Western academic debates and recent deliberations over Japanese citizenship.

T. H. Marshall’s (1950) landmark statement saw citizenship as a collection of rights that had grown and changed over time, from basic civil-legal rights to political rights of electoral participation and finally to social welfare provisions, i.e., social citizenship. Social citizenship expanded beyond the provision of basic needs (e.g., food, shelter, emergency care) to include educational services, a minimal standard of living and universal health care. Observers recently introduced the concept of cultural citizenship, as a form beyond social citizenship. Cultural citizenship is the state’s recognition, protection and reinforcement of the cultural traditions, practices and identities of minority peoples who are included as citizens.1 It asserts forms of multi-culturalism that resist the destruction of minority cul-

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*Key words: citizenship, multiculturalism, assimilation, national identity  
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1) On cultural citizenship see Pakulski (1997), Miller (2002), Stevenson (2003 a; 2003 b), and Van Hensbroek (2010).
tures by their total assimilation into the dominant culture.

Building on T. H. Marshall’s evolutionary model of citizenship, Turner (2017) identified four citizenship types: ethno-national, social welfare, workforce and consumer. Ethno-national citizenship emerged in the 19th century during the formation and consolidation of nation-states. Social-welfare citizenship emerged in the mid-20th century as many states, led by Scandinavia, expanded their social services and civil society institutions to care for individuals. Workforce citizenship developed at the end of the 20th century as states shrunk their state-managed welfare system and privatized social services. The last type, consumer citizenship, is emerging in the early 21st century as part of spreading neo-liberalism. With a reduction in state-support, citizen protection has devolved to individual consumers who must seek marketplace solutions without the sociability of shared public civic spaces.

Observers understand citizenship to be a multi-dimensional concept, and its dimensions reflect diverse positions in the citizenship debates. Joppke (2007: 38) identified three dimensions of citizenship: as a status, a collection of rights (or formal capacities and immunities that flow from the status) and as identity. Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2008) accepted Joppke’s three dimensions but added a fourth, citizenship as participation. Bosniak (2006: 20) described citizenship as having four dimensions, “status, rights, political engagement and identity.” Such multiple dimensions tend to combine a range of issues. Below I have consolidated diverse debate positions into six issues to simplify the discussion.

The Six Issues

1. Citizenship as a membership category for social inclusion and protection

The traditional concept of citizenship is as a legal status that includes a set of formal rights. Recent debates coalesced around the idea that citizenship represents a form of membership. Citizens are members accepted within a collectivity. Citizenship signals that they are to be granted the same considerations and protections as other members, creating an equalizing effect across all members.

“Citizen-as-member” highlights the issue of citizenship acquisition, i.e., the basis on which membership is to be granted. Acquisition is rarely problematic for most of citizens. They acquired citizenship status and membership by being born within the borders of a nation’s sovereign territory or as the offspring of current citizens. Oppressed or minority people and those from ambiguous borderlands or with contested parentage may not be accepted as members-citizens for inclusion.

Nations provide multiple pathways to acquire citizenship. These include the following, individually or in combination. First, by “blood” as the legitimate, recognized offspring of a citizen; (This path is formalized as the *jus sanguine* legal principle and aligns with an ethno-nationalist or racial criteria for national identity and membership); Second, by birth within a nation’s territory; (This is the *jus soli* legal principle that aligns with a civil or abstract legal principles criteria for national identity and membership); Third, by passing a nation’s naturalization requirements and procedures. Naturalization procedures require a period of residence, a record of good health and law obedience, recommendations or approval by current citizens, and passing language, cultural knowledge or other tests. Marriage to a citizen often speeds naturalization. Naturalization is designed to ensure that new citizens have assimilated and will conform to the behavioral standards of a nation’s idealized citizen-members.

Just as legal status differs from the recent emphasis on membership/inclusion, assigning formal rights differs from extending protections and equal considerations. Citizenship is a “right to have
rights” and these granted “rights” include social-economic protections. The welfare state has provided citizens with protections: from ill health or poor nutrition, abuse in the workplace, absence of literacy and work skills, racial discrimination; and it also provided basic living standards, clean air and water, basic sanitation, public safety, and so forth.2)

Some citizen protections are not available to non-citizens. In recent debates, citizenship is seen less as a binary concept (i.e., a person either is or is not a citizen) and more as variable concept. As Morris-Suzuki (2015: 69) noted, we see “a range of different sets of capabilities stretching towards the idealized vision of the ‘full citizen.’” Thus, we can position individuals along a continuum from total non-citizenship to complete citizenship. Concepts such as semi, partial, contingent, differentiated and second-class citizenship describe points along such a continuum of citizenship.

2. Citizenship as practice and process

The traditional view of citizenship is a fixed collection of formal rights embodied in a nation’s laws. Observers now see citizenship as a dynamic process of capabilities more than as a static status, and citizenship is embodied more in everyday activities and social relationships than in formal laws. Thus, “actual” citizenship is defined more by the actions of ordinary community members than by what resides in legal documents. Turner (2001: 192) argued, “rather than define citizenship within a static framework of rights and obligations, it is valuable to conceptualize citizenship as process.”

As Chung (2010: 31) noted, “when we examine only one dimension, such a membership, we miss the constantly changing, interactive, and local process of citizenship in its everyday interpretation, communication and exercise as well as the informal constraints and encouragements of its practice.” Chung extended the citizenship-as-participation theme beyond formal participation in governance (i.e., voting, office holding) to a range of citizen-to-non citizen practices. Similarly, Somers (1993: 589) argued for redefining citizenship as an “instituted process” and defined “instituted process” as:

institutionally embedded social practices . . . [that are] contingent upon and constituted by networks of relationships . . . Citizenship practices emerge from the articulation of national organizations and universal rules with the particularisms and varying political cultures of local environment. . . Citizenship practices are also a source of political identity – the translation of this identity into a rights based positive citizenship identity depends entirely on the contexts of activation. . . citizenship rights can emerge only in certain institution-specific relational settings and only in the context of particular social practices, namely practices that support popular public spheres. Popular public spheres must be infused by participation from members of active civil societies.

3. Thin-passive versus active, substantive or thick citizenship

Observers have distinguished a traditional “thin” or passive form of citizenship from a “thick,” active and “substantive” form. Although the content of “thick” citizenship varies, it differs from “thin” by requiring individual engagement or participation, an awareness of citizen rights and protections, a meaningful scope of protection-coverage, and effective implementation by state or other authorities.

“Thin” citizenship is extended to persons without their engagement or awareness, has sparse scope, and lacks effective citizenship rights-protections. It might exist only in formal documents or of-

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ficial policy statements and not require individual acknowledgement or activity. It is granted from above, not fought over, achieved and cherished from below by active citizens. The state does not require intentionality, only a passive acceptance of basic requirements (e.g., obeying laws, paying taxes, serving in military if requested, and so forth); citizens take their rights or status for granted. “Thick” citizenship suggests an engaged, active citizen; someone who is aware of his/her citizenship status and who participates to exercise and expand citizenship rights and protections.

4. Gender and social-economic position

Citizenship status is attached the performance of certain gendered social-economic roles. In nearly all Western nations the traditional citizen was a male who could serve as a soldier. He was also the head of a household and made economic contributions as an employee, self-employed producer, or investor. Traditional citizenship requirements of military conscription and economic activity (through owning property, working for wages, and paying taxes) were male life activities that occurred in the public sphere.

The restrictions on women’s voting, property and rights of self-determination are well known. Despite being formal citizens of a nation state, women were denied most citizenship rights until the 20th century. Traditional conceptions of citizenship omitted the activities, perspectives and roles of women. While discussing expanding citizenship, Sassen (2002: 285) remarked, “these are dimensions of citizenship and citizenship practices which do not fit the indicators and categories of mainstream frameworks for understanding citizenship...Women in the condition of housewives and mothers do not fit the categories and indicators used to capture participation in public life.”

The family also shaped citizenship. As Turner (2008: 53) observed, “the foundation of national citizenship and the basis of individual entitlement remains legally and socially connected with heterosexual reproduction and hence with the nuclear family.” Formal citizenship in most countries assumed a traditional heterosexual family pattern in which women were defined as daughters, wives or mothers (or prostitutes) whose primary responsibilities were to biologically reproduce the population, socialize the next generation and maintain a household. Women’s labor and income were either ignored or seen as supplemental and secondary. Excluded from an active public, political life outside of the home, women’s lives were considered centered around the private, inner household where they provided comfort/care to a male citizen and his dependents — children, the sick or disabled or elderly.

After observers foregrounded the overwhelming masculine orientation in the traditional citizenship concept, their attention shifted to the unpaid nurturing-caring and reproduction activities that are essential for the continuation of a society and that women performed within private household units. As the meaning of citizenship expanded beyond free adult males in the public sphere, a new conceptualization emerged in which citizenship embraced “rights and protections” for a full range of emotional, relational, and nurturing/caring activities that occurred in both the private and public spheres. This new perspective asked us to “reconceptualize the citizen as situated in the ties between household, community, identity, and employment structures” (Staeheli and Clarke 2003: 122).

5. Nationality and Citizenship

Traditionally, nationality and citizenship are blurred together or are synonymous. The social-

3) Gender is discussed in Berkovitch (1999), Orloff (1993), Stevens (1999), and Yuval-Davis (1993, 2011).
cultural category of national community member is treated as being equivalent to the formal-legal status of citizen. Debates noted confusion over the terms and analytically decoupled citizenship from nationality.

Citizenship is a set of practices-activities, while nationality indicates membership in the nation, i.e., an “imagined” collective with a common culture-language-history, self-identity or territory occupation. Smith (1986) envisioned a primordial collective, the “ethnie,” that provides a basis for the nation; it existed prior to the rise of nation states and citizenship.

Increasingly, we see nations as multi-cultural, whether through the expressions of previously suppressed indigenous people, a growing self-awareness by minority peoples, or international migration. This questions earlier, simplistic notions of the nation as a single, homogenous people that neatly overlaps with the status of a citizen. Nationality suggests member of the nation; citizenship also suggests membership, but not necessarily membership in the nation. The citizen as member implies inclusion and an equality of treatment-protection, but it does not assume the nation.

6. Sites of Citizenship

Citizenship has been defined as the individual’s relationship to the nation state. It is most visible at international border crossings, in government documents and the courts, and in national government offices. Nonetheless, early citizenship in Western Europe developed at levels of the city and empire (Kostakopoulou 2008 and Prak 2018). With the rise of the nation state in the 19th century, citizenship developed as part of a democratic or republican nation state that supplanted earlier state forms (i.e., monarchies) in which the relation between state and individual had been that of ruler and subject.

By the early 21st century, globalization shifted attention to the appearance a transnational or global citizenship status aligned with universal human rights. This transnational site of citizenship has not replaced nation-state citizenship as much as it has been laid on top of the nation state form. Stateless individuals, such as refugees, may lose national citizenship rights but maintain the status and rights of a global or universal citizen.

Others emphasize sites of denizenship within municipalities and local civil society. With a spread of denizenship or domicile citizenship, long-term or “permanent” residents receive a quasi-citizenship status. It is anchored at the level of community civil society or with a local municipality. This status is realized through local policies and practices, such as civil protections and rights to public services, to vote in local elections, or to public sector jobs. It differs from the traditional status of citizen that a national government recognizes.

Japanese Citizenship and the Six Debated Issues

1. Citizenship as a membership category for social inclusion and protection in Japan

The translation of the word “citizen” reveals deliberations over citizenship and membership in Japanese society. Morris-Suzuki (2015: 68) observed, “the English word ‘citizenship’ is deeply ambiguous because it confuses two phenomena: on the one hand, formal nationality (kokuseki 国籍), and on the other, the political and social rights that are supposed to be the birth right of those who hold

4) See Fox (2005), Isin (2009), and Sassen (2002).
5) On domicile citizenship see Hammar (1990), Pedroza (2013), Prak (2018), and Staeheli (2003).
nationality in the modern democratic nation state” (see also Doak 1997). “Citizen” in English and European languages is translated as kokumin 国民 and shimin 市民. Kokumin expresses the relationship between an individual and the nation state. It signifies “people of the nation” or membership in Japan’s nation state. Shimin suggests “community member” as indicated by the characters for city and member-person. Other terms translated as citizen include jinmin 人民 with connotations of people outside the ruling class, and koumin 公民 that meant commoners based on natural law and the Imperial Family State (Koschmann 1996: 218; Parmenter et al. 2008: 206). Three terms, kokumin, shinmin and jinmin, were all used to refer to the people of Japan in the 1871 law that established the koseki 戸籍 a system of household registration (Chapman and Krogness 2014: 12). Kokumin has signified Japanese citizenship since the Meiji Restoration and after 1945 postwar leaders consciously selected kokumin for citizen over alternatives that had oppositional connotations (e.g. jinmin). 6) Avenell (2010: 10) summarized, the term shimin has been used variously as the Japanese translation for the French citoyen, burgher, citizen... It is also the translation for civil, as in civil society (shimin shakai)... and for civic, as in civic center (shimin kaikan). From the 1950s, activists sought to shift the meaning away from its origin as the resident of a town or city, and its Marxist connotations of petit bourgeois, and move it toward an agent of progressive social change. It came to be associated with spontaneity, autonomous action apart from and in opposition to the state, cosmopolitanism and even anti-establishment.

During a 1997 interview, former Prime Minister Nakasone, known for his effort to revitalize Japanese nationalism, touched upon shimin and had problems with the word — not its specific use in Japanese law to designate a “min” (person) affiliated with a municipality “shi” (city) — but its use in political philosophy as a “member of a civic community” (see Weatherall 2007). For Nakasone, kokumin bound min to the state whereas shimin bound the min with an abstract civic community — and entity other than the nation state. For social movement activists, kokumin is the antithesis of their progressive practice of citizenship that is beyond the nation state (Avenell 2015).

Ogawa (2009: 145-184) also discussed the uses of shimin. Once an academic term that corresponded to the propertied class or bourgeoisie among Marxist sociologists, its meaning shifted starting in the mid-1950s. By the 1970s, it signified “civic engagement by ordinary people in ordinary places” (p.168) and referred to citizens active in protest movements. Ogawa said with the expansion of NPOs in the 1990s, its meaning again shifted to mean people who support neoliberal politics and conservative devolution and who collaborate with authorities (p.159). No longer active citizens, Ogawa argued that the shimin had become a depoliticized “silent majority” indoctrinated to serve as volunteers and provide services so that the state no longer has to supply them.

Difficulties with translating “citizen” reveal conceptual disagreements. Is the citizen a state-recognized member of a racially-ethnically homogenous nation (minzoku kokka 民族国家), an active member of the civic community, or a long-time local resident (see Nakamatsu 2014)? If we see Japan’s population as a unitary racial-ethnic collective, then no distinction exists between a member of the ethno-racial nation-state and a member of the local civic community. Disputes over who is a citi-

zen arise from competing conceptualizations of the Japanese nation and its composition, and of the state-individual relationship.

Regarding protection, Japan provides citizen protection but without large public social-welfare programs. As Schoppa (2006: 2) remarked, “Japan built a system of social protection that relied largely on firms and families (especially women) to provide a safety net . . .” The postwar social protection system relied on an institutional system of large firms, full employment with rapid economic growth, and Japan’s gender regime as the alternative to expansive public social programs.7)

2. Citizenship as practice and process in Japan

As noted above, shimin has had multiple meanings. It has meant citizenship apart from the nation state in a classless community or locale, part of the ethnic nation or Volk (minzoku), and a person rooted in authentic daily life, seikatsusha 生活者 (Avenell 2010: 12). The emic concept seikatsusha is often translated as an ordinary citizen. Its core concept, seikatsu (生活) suggests livelihood, daily practice, or a person’s everyday activities (i.e., language, food, housing, customs, recreation, and clothing). As Maclachlan (1997: 115) observed, “the concept embraces the notion of citizenship within both the nation and civil society (shimin shakai)” [and suggests a . . . “multi-faceted and proactive human being situated at the confluence of the social, economic, and political spheres.” It is an idea of the citizen based on a person’s mundane daily practices, and it reinforces the idea of an evolving form of Japanese citizenship that is rooted in the practices of ordinary people.8)

3. Substantive or thick citizenship in Japan

Low voter turnout and apathic responses to electoral politics would justify characterizing Japanese citizenship as ‘thin.’ Yet, a thick or participatory type of citizenship has waned and waxed across Japan’s history. Political mobilization in the form of protest marches, demonstrations, and vocal political expression during the immediate post-war period and 1960s are well known.9) Although the LDP’s (Liberal Democratic Party, in power for most of the postwar period) dominance has dampened electoral activism and turnout, local citizen activism accelerated after the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. The subsequent NPO (non-profit organizations) law resulted in higher levels of civil society activity, or a growing thick-substantive citizenship.

Participation in local civil society groups and grass roots activism carries the potential to redefine citizenship. NPOs grew after the new 1997 law and “while new groups are on the rise, traditional membership organizations, such as neighborhood associations, women’s groups, volunteer fire departments, and volunteer welfare commissioners, continue to be supported at very high rates . . . . These organizations continue to be the mainstay of Japan’s civil society” (Haddad 2007: 432). Japan has a higher proportion of its population in NPOs (1.2 percent) than any country except the United States.10)

Pekkanen (2006) argued that Japan has a distinctive civil society among the advanced industrial democracies. The Japanese state has shaped civil society into a dual pattern by promoting small, local

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neighborhood organizations while simultaneously hindering large, professionalized organizations. At the local level, Japan has extensive social capital and numerous community networks, but these social resources lack connections to stable national-level professionalized advocacy organizations.

4. Gender and social-economic position in Japan

The typical Japanese citizen is envisioned as an employed male (Mackie 2002, Sugimoto 2014: 1-2). Morris-Suzuki (2015: 74) observed, “the most visible and rapid transformation of Japanese citizenship during the occupation was the expansion of the civic rights of women.” Studies documented significant political-civic “citizenship” activity among Japanese women whose profile in elected political offices remains low. Although rarely at the forefront of visible political activity, women “experience different kinds of mobilization” and membership in a women’s organization increases the probability of voting (Steel 2004, 229; 237). Women’s citizenship activity takes a less visible, grass-roots form.

Family also has been central to defining Japanese citizenship. The koseki tohon is a registration system that connects citizenship to a person’s family status. Krogness (2014: 145) suggested, “the koseki constitutes a ledger of the citizens of Japan,” and that Japan’s true citizenship acquisition regime is jus koseki.

5. Nationality and Citizenship in Japan

The debunked myth of homogeneity and the acknowledgement of Japan’s minorities and immigrants has caused a reevaluation of relationship between Japanese national identity and substantive citizenship. As Doak (1997: 309) observed, “ethnicity was always a political tool . . . employed over and over against other, competing concepts of the political community, including the constitutional state, the multi-ethnic empire and civil society.” The presence of ethnic minorities and diversity within Japan has been the basis for a differentiated citizenship (Kibe 2006, Morris-Suzuki 2015).

Japan officially follows the jus sanguine (i.e., bloodline) citizenship acquisition principle (Kashiwazaki 1998). Accepting foreigner outsiders-immigrants into Japanese society and its citizenship system is complex. For example, Richey (2010) found a strong anti-immigrant sentiment, however, the Japanese who favored immigrant assimilation supported increasing immigration and equal rights for immigrants more than the Japanese multiculturalists did. Immigration opponents tended to adhere strongly to a myth of Japanese uniqueness. Nagayoshi’s (2011 a) analysis found widespread support for multiculturalism and positive views about sharing citizenship with persons of non-Japanese origin. She observed (2011 a: 572) “only around 15 per cent of the respondents disagree with the conferment on immigrants of the same rights that Japanese citizens enjoy.” Yet, most people also embrace an ethno-national Japanese identity that requires assimilation for full equality. Kashiwazaki (2013: 44) argued that multicultural incorporation as foreigners represents a progressive idea and offers a promising path for overcoming the conventional nation-state system. Paradoxically, as participants in public discourse engage in and respond to this prevailing pattern of claims-making . . . they are simultane-
ously contributing to a reinforcement of the ethnically homogenous conception of Japanese nationhood.

The citizenship-nationality issue takes the form of a debate between multiculturalism versus assimilation. Increasing de-facto immigration may intensify this issue. Citing 2005-2008 discussions within top levels of the LDP, rising numbers of permanent resident foreign workers, and the multiculturalism versus assimilation debate, Tai (2009: 336) observed, “...Japan has become a country of immigrants without intending to become one” (see also Green 2017, Hollifeld and Orlando 2017).

6. Sites of Citizenship in Japan

At the national and official level, “Citizenship laws in Japan have remained largely unchanged since the end of World War II... Not only have citizenship laws remained remarkably stable, they have for the most part not even been questioned” (Surak 2008: 563). Although Japan’s official citizenship regime remains unchanged, non-citizen residents have been moving toward citizenship due to international pressures and pragmatic actions by local-level officials (Lu, Menju and Williams 2005).

The acceptance of non-Japanese people based on interpersonal contacts and repeated informal social interactions in civil society provide a pathway to quasi-citizenship expansion at the local level. Many have noted that the distinction between being a Japanese citizen and being a foreigner/non-citizen is blurring at the local level. Graburn and Ertl (2008: 9) stated, “involved citizens are prevalent in neighborhoods throughout Japan, who choose for various reasons to reach out to their foreign neighbors, host international students, visit a foreign country, and form interpersonal ‘multicultural’ friendships.” As Takezawa (2008: 40) summarized, “while the national government maintains its position of restricting suffrage to Japanese nationals, support for local suffrage by a large number of local governments throughout Japan in a sense questions what membership in Japanese society means at the local and national levels.”

Studies find support for both the group threat theory and the contact hypothesis in Japan. Opposition to foreigners may be exaggerated in national surveys that ask about “foreigners” generally because respondents rely on stereotypes. Direct contact and interchange in informal civil society increases the acceptance of foreigners. An experimental study by Kobayashi et. al. (2015: 17-18) found “individual foreign workers in Japan are viewed more positively than the groups or categories that they embody” [moreover] “the average citizen is more inclined to extend political membership to Japanese society than deny it.” As Takao (2003: 547) has observed, “by officially calling for the granting of foreigners’ local suffrage, nearly half the local governments in Japan have now challenged the statisticians’ claim that only states can specify individual rights within their sovereign territories, and that citizenship cannot exist apart from nationality.”

Conclusion

The “explosion” of interest and debate around the concept of citizenship over the past two dec-

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15) On personal contact effects see Green and Kadoya (2015), Nagayoshi (2011 b), and Tanabe (2011).
ades has yielded a vast literature, but one focused most entirely on the experiences in Western Europe and North America. Although the deliberations over immigration, civil society, multiculturalism, and national identity in Japan often appear to be nation specific, they are best seen as forms of the same actively debated citizenship issues. Discussions about the evolving and contested meanings of “citizen” outside of Japan could benefit from a greater awareness of Japan’s deliberations, and an increased participation with the external debates may contribute to deliberations within Japan.

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Deliberations Over Citizenship and Japanese Citizenship

ABSTRACT

Social scientists have actively debated the concept of citizenship since the 1990s. Most discussions occurred within a Western academic context and only referenced the experiences of Europe and North America. This paper examines recent conceptualizations of citizenship and considers their relevance for citizenship in Japan. More than a technical translation or legal issue, the evolving and contested meanings of “citizen” inside Japan has direct parallels to issues that are at the center of academic discourse on the concept beyond Japan.

Key Words: citizenship, multiculturalism, assimilation, national identity