 multiculturalism in Japan: an analysis and critique

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INTRODUCTION

Multiculturalism in Japan is a topic of growing interest among policy-makers, business leaders, and scholars in part due to the influx of immigrant labor since the late 1980s (Brannen, 2011; A. Kondo, 2011; Papademetriou & Hamilton, 2000). Although the myth of racioethnicity1) “homogeneity” in Japan persists in the governmental and public discourse, there is a significant presence of minority groups such as the indigenous Ainu and Okinawans, Zainichi Koreans, and various new immigrant groups, who are part of this increasingly diverse society.

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1) In this paper, we use the term “racioethnicity” to refer jointly to “race” and “ethnicity,” as it is not our intention to expound on debates about the existence of and distinction between these terms in this paper.
Some may say that there is a moral imperative to multiculturalism that reflects social or national norms that result from the historical development of nation building, not unlike what has happened in other advanced nations. Others cite the country’s decreasing population and economic stagnation as practical reasons to promote the integration of minority groups (A. Nakamura, Nakamura, & Seike, 2004). Unfortunately, however, Japan’s efforts toward multiculturalism have not been met with a warm reception. Critics argue that Japan fails to recognize its postwar responsibility to its colonial descendants and that the main policy for promoting multiculturalism is supporting the acquisition of the Japanese language. In other words, many note that without a post-colonial perspective, the issue of multiculturalism is rendered almost meaningless (Choi & Kato, 2008; Minority Rights Group International, 2013; UN CERD, 2010).

Further, few Japanese scholars focus on discrimination- and racioethnicity-related issues within the context of Japan, based on the faulty premise that Japan is not a nation of immigrants. These scholars instead choose to conduct research regarding other national contexts. Thus, while researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers proclaim the importance of a more multicultural Japan, there has been little effort to systematically observe, describe, and address fundamental issues that impede multiculturalism in this context.

Our aim is to discuss several fundamental issues, including misconceptions about the cultural heterogeneity of Japan, an erroneous definition and understanding of what constitutes multiculturalism, and the tendency to categorize individuals, implicitly or explicitly, as insiders and outsiders. We begin with a few key definitions, followed by an overview of the national and historical context and applications of theory to this context. We note several barriers to multiculturalism along the way, though our discussion is not meant to be exhaustive. Furthermore, we refer primarily to the Zainichi Korean minority group as a case in point, but it should be noted that various minority groups likely experience both common and unique challenges in the Japanese national context. Finally, we close with a few basic recommendations, with the caveat that much more research is required on this topic.

KEY DEFINITIONS

Multiculturalism and Other Acculturation Strategies

Acculturation refers to the society- and group-level cultural changes that result from continuous contact between different cultural groups (Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987; Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). Psychological acculturation refers to those cultural changes as they occur at the individual level (Berry et al., 1987), but we focus primarily on acculturation at the cultural group and societal levels.

The dominant model of acculturation is Berry’s (1984, 2006 a; Berry et al., 1987) two-dimensional conceptualization, which incorporates 1) the value placed on maintaining unique cultural identities and characteristics, and 2) the value placed on maintaining relationships with other cultural groups. The crossing of these two dimensions results in four basic acculturation strategies for cultural groups: assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization.

Groups pursuing assimilation place high importance on maintaining relationships with other (particularly the dominant) cultural groups but little or no importance on maintaining the group’s unique cultural identity or characteristics. This means that groups pursuing the assimilation strategy
seek conformity with society. A group pursuing a separation strategy conversely places high importance on its unique cultural identity and characteristics and low importance on relationships with other groups. Such groups therefore strive to maintain their own way of life, isolated from the cultural groups comprising the rest of society. The integration strategy, however, entails placing high importance on both maintaining a unique cultural identity and maintaining relationships with other groups. A group utilizing this strategy will maintain many of its defining cultural characteristics but will also adapt certain aspects in order to participate with the other groups in society. Finally, when a group does not seek to maintain its unique cultural identity or relationships with other groups, it is utilizing a marginalization strategy. This strategy may be the only option available for a cultural minority group if the dominant group does not allow it to express its cultural identity and refuses to allow its members to participate in society (Berry, 1984, 2006a; Berry et al., 1987). This relates to a societal-level acculturation strategy, which we discuss next.

Culturally diverse societies may similarly implement policies and practices that correspond to any of the four strategies defined above, which are termed respectively at the societal level as the melting pot, segregation, multiculturalism, and exclusion. (Berry, 1984, 2006a; Berry et al., 1987). We should note that societies, often led by dominant cultural groups, may pursue a strategy that is not in line with the preferred strategy of particular cultural groups or individuals (Berry, 2006a; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997). An individual or cultural group desiring integration, for example, may only pursue such a strategy if the larger society promotes multiculturalism. In other words, groups desiring integration may run into obstacles if the larger society is rather a melting pot, with policies and practices designed to strip cultural minorities of their cultural identities and practices to assimilate them into the dominant societal culture.

Scholars have argued that Japan as a society utilizes different acculturation strategies for different cultural groups. For example, Otsuka (2008) argues that policies toward Japanese Brazilians (Brazilians of Japanese ethnic descent who have immigrated to Japan) tend to follow exclusion, leaving many of these individuals marginalized, despite the fact that most of them desire integration. Even now, many Westerners who are able to achieve Japanese language and cultural proficiency may en-

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Figure 1 Multiculturalism as an Acculturation Strategy

Adapted from Berry (2006)
joy treatment more akin to multiculturalism or integration (Komisarof, 2009, 2011), but Zainichi Koreans, to be discussed in greater detail, may arguably be treated as minorities to be assimilated under a melting pot approach. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to categorize the society-level acculturation strategy of Japan.

In contrast to Japan, some European and North American countries attempt multiculturalism or integration as the preferred acculturation strategy at the societal level. However, it is worth noting that even multicultural policies are based on certain identifiable values, such as individual freedom, the rule of law, freedom of expression and mutual respect. These values may sometimes be interpreted as devices for assimilation (rather than the intended integration) as they are considered leveling tools, therefore subject to criticism. However, due to the fact that such values are explicitly identified, it is far easier to have a genuine understanding and honest debate about a society’s approach to include minority groups than it would be if such values were not made explicit.

In Japan, the conditions for acculturation and inclusion remain vague, and this, in practice, often results in some form of individual acculturation that involves the denial of one’s cultural heritage. For example, long-term residents—particularly Koreans and Chinese, whose outward appearances are often not easily distinguishable from those of the ethnic majority—may attempt some form of assimilation or integration, but aspects of Japanese policy and society often lead to failure. Particularly for the Koreans, the assimilation policy implemented during the colonial period (1910–1945) neither successfully assimilated or integrated them, as this policy treated these individuals as second-class citizens, perpetuating the idea that Koreans were inferior to the Japanese and would not attain equal status. We explore the seemingly contradictory idea that minorities often seem to be both assimilated and treated as outsiders in Japan, but it is first useful to explore how “multiculturalism” is defined in the Japanese context and then begin to examine a case in point.

Multiculturalism as Defined in Japan

“Tabunka-kyousei” is the Japanese term commonly used for “multiculturalism,” but it literally means “the coexistence of multiple cultures.” Some scholars in Japan have taken issue with this term, as it does not necessarily involve the concept of mutual respect or the preservation of the cultural heritage of minorities. Therefore, equating the Japanese concept of tabunka-kyousei to “multiculturalism” as defined in the international scholarship on acculturation cited previously is funda-

![Figure 2 Multiculturalism as Defined in Japan](image-url)
mentally flawed, in that *tabunka-kyousei* is entirely assimilative, rather than integrative, in nature. Efforts toward co-existence are disproportionately imposed on the minority groups to live harmoniously with the Japanese (Lee, 2006), while the Japanese ethnic majority is under little or no obligation to exert effort toward change in order to facilitate a harmonious co-existence with minority groups. To further this point, Burgess (2004) notes that the term “*tabunka-kyousei*” is rarely used by minority group members and rather counterproductively emphasizes the existence of a majority-minority hierarchy, though this emphasis is generally unintentional on the part of the ethnic Japanese majority. Many scholars therefore prefer the more recent term “*tabunka-shugi*,” which is arguably closer to the English term, as shown in Figure 2. Use of this more recent term is therefore preferred, though further education in Japanese society on its true meaning is still necessary, as will be seen in the discussions to follow.

In order to better understand issues relating to multiculturalism in Japan, we next discuss the historical context.

**NATIONAL CONTEXT AND ZAINICHI KOREANS AS A CASE IN POINT**

In this section, we explore the post-World War II context of Japan and its attempts to deal with racioethnic minorities, with particular emphasis on the past 40 years. As a concrete case in point, we focus largely on the Zainichi Korean minority group. Racioethnic Korean individuals with roots in the Japanese occupation of Korea (1910−1945) are often referred to as “Zainichi Koreans.” The term “*zainichi*” literally means “being in Japan,” but it is generally understood not to include Korean foreigners who have immigrated to Japan from Korea after the colonial period.

After World War II, Japan and the Allied Forces sought reconstruction and the resolution of several issues from the days of Imperial Japan. For Koreans in Japan, a critical issue was their legal status, particularly with regard to their nationality. As a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Koreans were considered a liberated ethnic group, and their Japanese nationality (obtained from their being colonial subjects) was taken away without their consent. However, preceding this official international resolution, the Japanese Government issued the 1947 Alien Registration Order—the final Imperial order and precedent to the modern Alien Registration Law—which declared that Koreans in Japan would be designated as having the nationality of Chousen (a term used in Japan to refer to the Korean peninsula as a whole, prior to the partition of 1948). Peculiarly, due to the fact that there were no diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea at that time, the designation of Chousen recorded in the Alien Registration Order did not technically function as a category of nationality. Until the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, although all Korean nationals in Japan were registered as being of Chousen nationality, those who desired permanent residency status in Japan actually had to first obtain South Korean (or Kankoku) nationality. Hence, the Korean community in Japan was, and still remains, divided into Kankoku and Chousen nationalities.

The nationality issue is particularly salient if one is aware of the fact that in certain countries, such as Canada and the U.S., nationality is granted to individuals who are simply born within the borders of those countries, irrespective of their national heritage. We submit that multiculturalism policies are inherently intertwined with policies regarding citizenship and nationality. While the necessity of granting citizenship to individuals born on a country’s soil might legitimately be debated,
there is little question about the excessiveness of barriers to permanent residency, let alone citizenship, for post-occupation Koreans. Perhaps both as a result of such policies and as a result of common assumptions about the inferiority of Koreans, social benefits and job opportunities for Zainichi Koreans were scarce. Eventually, however, Zainichi Korean discrimination issues bubbled to the surface and could be clearly observed in the infamous Hitachi employment discrimination case of the 1970s.

In the early 1970s, Park Jong Suk, a second-generation Zainichi Korean, applied for a job at the Hitachi factory in Kanagawa prefecture. In his application, he used his Japanese name, which is referred to as tsuumei. Obtaining a Japanese name was mandated under a pre-war policy known as Soushi-kaiimei, which pressured Koreans to take on Japanese names. Many Zainichi Koreans felt pressure to continue this practice post-occupation in order to hide their Korean heritage and avoid discrimination. Park passed the initial application process and received a notice of hiring. He was then asked to bring his family registry (koseki-touhon), which showed his registered family hometown to be in Korea, where his parents were born. Hitachi refused to hire Park, accusing him of lying about his name in his initial application. Park felt he did not deceive Hitachi, since he had used this tsuumei his entire life and that his registered family hometown was just that—the hometown of his family. He and his Japanese supporters felt that Hitachi was discriminating on the basis of ethnicity, and he subsequently sued the company.

The legal proceedings went on for three-and-one-half years, resulting in a landmark decision in 1974 by the Yokohama District Court in favor of Park. This ruling was the first time since post-war Japan that a Japanese court concluded that ethnic discrimination is wrong. This case impacted not only the Korean community but also the greater Japanese society because it showed that under the law, ethnic discrimination is illegal. However, hate speech and racist remarks against minority groups are legal under the pretense of freedom of expression.

During the 1980s, the debate continued about whether and how minorities should be recognized as members of their own communities and of Japanese society. While the Hitachi case in the 1970s challenged discrimination in employment, the anti-fingerprinting movement of the 1980s challenged Japanese society to recognize the voices of minorities in the broader political and social context. The mandatory requirement of all long-term foreigners to be fingerprinted came under the 1947 Alien Registration Order (mentioned previously as the order in which also Koreans were designated as having Chousen nationality). This order was the basis for the Alien Registration Law that likewise included the requirement that all long-term foreigners be fingerprinted.

As a result, all Koreans over 14 years old, (later 16 years old) had to be fingerprinted. Unlike the Hitachi struggle, in which Park had obtained a relatively limited group of supporters, the fingerprinting requirement galvanized and mobilized a mass movement. At its peak, over 12,000 foreigners (mainly Zainichi Koreans) refused to be fingerprinted. This brought greater awareness among the general Japanese public of the plight of the Koreans in the country, increasing the visibility of this large minority group. It was in this social and political climate that the idea of tabunka-kyosei garnered substantial interest in Japanese society.

This period also saw increasing immigration from other Asian countries, further provoking discussion about the roles such individuals should play in society, as well as the type and extent of support society and government should provide to them. Increasing awareness of the “comfort
women” issue also fueled discussions of intergroup relations in Japan.

In 2005, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications inaugurated the Study Group on *Tabunka-Kyosei* and issued a lengthy report claiming to promote multiculturalism in Japan. Instead, however, the report merely advocated teaching foreigners the Japanese language (Sakanaka, 2008) and how to respond to natural disasters (Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2006). The latter was a reflection of what happened during the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, when false rumors about Koreans engaging in criminal activities in the aftermath of the disaster resulted in over 6,000 Koreans being killed by Japanese vigilantes and the police force. Thus, this report elucidated the Japanese Government’s view of foreigners—particularly those of Korean descent—as potential criminals, and did not actually promote multiculturalism, as the name of the study group would imply.

Of note, Japan’s history with Zainichi Koreans and other minority groups has attracted the attention of human rights organizations, including the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD), which have been explicit about their concerns regarding the discriminatory treatment of minorities in Japan (Minority Rights Group International, 2013; UN CERD, 2010). These organizations address the Japanese Government as they propose such recommendations as more effective nondiscrimination legislation and the limiting of discriminatory and/or exclusive speech by government officials in order to promote an environment that is more conducive to a multicultural society. However, in its response to the UN CERD’s report, the Japanese Government states that “Japan has taken every conceivable measure to fight against racial discrimination” (Japanese Government, 2013, p.3). While this may indeed be the genuine belief among many individuals in government and even the general public, we submit that there is likely more that can be done to see Japan develop as a truly multicultural society, as will be discussed in the next section.

**ON THE APPLICABILITY AND MERITS OF MULTICULTURALISM IN JAPAN**

Before discussing how Japan might better embrace multiculturalism, it is important to address the issue of whether Japan should do so. This issue may be expressed in terms of two major questions: 1) Is there enough cultural diversity in Japanese society to even warrant a discussion of multiculturalism? and 2) If so, would a multicultural approach provide benefits over other approaches? In other words, we must establish whether multiculturalism has both applicability to and merit within the Japanese national context.

**Applicability of Multiculturalism to Japan**

As Burgess (2004) notes, recent scholarship has exhibited an increasing recognition of the ra-

cioethnic and cultural diversity of Japan. However, perceptions of homogeneity persist among the Japanese public, foreigners, and even scholars and members of the Japanese Government (Burgess, 2004; Kirk, 2014; Mainichi Shimbun, 2008; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007). There are 2,049,123 registered foreigners in Japan (Japanese Statistics Bureau, 2013; see Tables 1 and 2), comprising about

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2) The Japanese term for “comfort women” (“*ianfu*”) uses *kanji* characters meaning “comfort and safety women,” may imply that such women were willing to give “comfort” to men. Nothing could be further from the truth.
1.6% of the population, so there is little question as to why such perceptions exist. However, while these numbers and the numbers compiled in the census provide information on the homogeneity of citizenship status in Japan, they do not provide insight into the racial and cultural diversity of Japan.

Statistics compiled by the Japanese Government do not take into account, for example, the Ainu—indigenous people of the northern island of Hokkaido (approximately 20,000 to 50,000 people; UN CERD, 2010). Nor does it consider the diverse makeup of the over 1.4 million people in the unique cultural group of the southern Ryukyu islands, which includes Okinawa (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2013). Similarly, such statistics do not capture the many mixed-race Japanese nationals—one in every thirty births in Japan to couples including one foreign parent (Chunichi Shimbun, 2008)—or the thousands of people who are naturalized every year (Chapman, 2008).

Furthermore, returning to the case of the Zainichi Korean minority, 373,689 (71%) of the 526,575 registered Koreans in Japan are classified as “special permanent residents” (Japanese Statistics Bureau, 2013). Special permanent residency is typically granted to individuals and their descendants who came to Japan during the Japanese occupation of Korea and lost Japanese citizenship with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, this number does not accurately represent the Zainichi Korean community. In addition to these special permanent residents, it is estimated that between 1952 and 2000, almost 250,000 Koreans became Japanese citizens, and that about 10,000 do so each year (Chapman, 2008). Thus, the Zainichi Korean community is significantly larger than the Japanese Statistics Bureau’s data would suggest.

Finally, going beyond even racial and ethnic diversity, the racial and ethnic Japanese majority itself is characterized by a good degree of diversity in its own right, considering the individuals who face discrimination as members of the Burakumin minority, a grouping based on the old feudal caste system; Japanese-Brazilians who have immigrated to Japan; and numerous foreign-born and/or foreign-raised Japanese nationals—often referred to as “returnees”—who often also face discrimination in employment. Thus, Japan is quite diverse, meaning that multiculturalism is arguably as applicable to this national context as it is to the U.S., Canada, or Australia. The next logical step for our inquiry, therefore, is to determine whether an approach rooted in multiculturalism has benefits over other approaches to diverse societies.
Merits of Multiculturalism in Japan

Research suggests that societies characterized as employing multiculturalism to integrate various groups of individuals tend to enjoy more benefits than those societies characterized as employing the melting pot (to assimilate minorities into the majority group), segregation (to separate minorities from the majority), or exclusion (in which minorities are marginalized). First, returning to the foundational work by Berry and colleagues (Berry, 1984, 2006a; Berry et al., 1987) discussed above, it is important to note that multiculturalism by definition allows the preservation of various cultures within a diverse society. Both the melting pot and exclusion seek to extinguish the cultures of minority groups by stripping them of their cultural practices, beliefs, languages, etc. Thus, if the preservation of various cultures has any intrinsic value, multiculturalism or segregation should be employed. Of course, even setting aside potential moral arguments against policies of segregation, research on other outcomes suggests that multiculturalism is the preferred approach.

For example, as Verkuyten and Thijs (2013) conclude in their review, multicultural policies in education have been shown to lead to positive inter-ethnic attitudes, less discrimination, and greater cultural knowledge. Further, management researchers suggest that diversity tends to lead to positive performance outcomes and attitudes when an organization takes a multicultural or integrative strategy in managing its diverse employees (Ely & Thomas, 2001; Ely, 2004; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Olsen & Martins, 2012; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). Multiculturalism is therefore a generally meritorious approach for groups and societies such as Japan, which are characterized by a significant degree of diversity.

Thus, having made arguments for both the applicability and merits of multiculturalism in the Japanese context, we now discuss how acculturation research may contribute insight into Japan’s current efforts toward multiculturalism and similarly how the Japanese experience might contribute to acculturation research.

DISCUSSION

As mentioned previously, the Japanese Government’s approach toward multiculturalism has centered on Japanese language education and on preparation for natural disasters and emergencies. While these efforts may be important to facilitate the adaptation of foreigners to the Japanese way of life, little attention has been paid to the cross-cultural adaptation among Japanese in the domestic context. This leaves the Japanese public generally ill-equipped to understand and possibly integrate the cultural values and practices of minorities in Japan.

Furthermore, there has been a recent push to equip students and workers in Japan with the skills necessary to allow Japanese companies to compete in global markets. However, these efforts have not addressed domestic diversity, and have even prescribed that such globally competent human resources in Japan must strengthen and preserve their “Japanese identity” in the midst of globalization (Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2011; Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2011). These globalization efforts do not include any particular consideration of whether that identity requirement should apply to Japan’s minorities, like the Zainichi Koreans, who might also be seeking global competence and who might be able to bring valuable skill sets to Japanese organizations.

Such policies as these tend to encourage foreigners and minorities to absorb the Japanese lan-
guage, culture, and perhaps even identity, at least within the domestic context. Efforts to promote any cultural change or adaptation on the part of the Japanese majority generally tend to be limited to cases in which these individuals must go overseas or work across national boundaries. Overall, therefore, these characteristics would seem to indicate a melting pot strategy, in which Government and societal efforts focus on the assimilation of minorities, as they are expected to conform to the cultural values and practices of the Japanese majority. These efforts involve very little, if any, reciprocal cultural change on the part of the cultural majority. Indeed, this observation is consistent with those of Motani (2002) and Nakajima (1985) in describing Japanese policies on the education of the Zainichi Korean youth.

However, as mentioned previously, Komisarof (2009) points out that different strategies are often used in Japan, depending on the national origin and racioethnicity of the minority group in question. For example, in contrast to the above policies and research suggesting assimilative strategies toward Zainichi Koreans, scholars have found that the strategies of integration or separation have been applied toward White Westerners (Bourhis et al., 1997; Inoue & Ito, 1993); marginalization or separation have been applied toward Black Americans (Russell, 1991); and assimilation or marginalization toward Japanese Americans, depending on their fluency in the Japanese culture and language (Asai, 2006; D. Kondo, 1990). This inconsistency is likely to evoke feelings of inequity and resentment if individuals of different minority groups are seeking the same acculturation outcomes. Indeed, such sentiments would be counterproductive to any efforts toward multiculturalism.

We previously discussed the general merits of an approach rooted in multiculturalism, but we should also note the importance of having congruence between a society’s acculturation strategy and individuals’ preferences. Individual adaptation to a particular societal context is more likely to occur when the individual seeks acculturation in a way that is consistent with the strategy of society (Berry, 2006 b). For example, individuals seeking integration may experience stress and maladaptation in a melting pot society. Therefore, in addition to understanding societal acculturation strategies, it is also important to understand general trends in the preferences of minority group members.

Returning to our case in point, researchers have noted significant variation in the acculturation preferences of Zainichi Koreans. These individuals, having spent most or all of their lives in Japan, often struggle with the difficult balance between assimilation via naturalization and the maintenance of cultural identity via the acceptance of permanent residency status. Many often also feel marginalized, having little familiarity with the Korean culture and facing discrimination in their “home” country of Japan. While many Zainichi Koreans indeed aim for integration, some aim for assimilation (usually due to social pressure), while still others aim for separation (Chapman, 2004, 2008; Motani, 2002).

If the Japanese national context is characterized as a melting pot toward Zainichi Koreans, we should expect that Zainichi Koreans seeking assimilation would achieve the congruence necessary for successful cultural adaptation. However, scholars suggest that this is not the case. Zainichi Koreans who attempt assimilation, congruent with Japanese melting pot policies, still often tend to experience acculturative stress and maladaptation (Weiner & Chapman, 2008). In order to explain such anomalies, we propose that other culturally determined social categorization processes are at work. Specifically, a strong cultural tendency to categorize individuals as part of the ingroup or outgroup (or, respectively uchi and soto, in Japanese) adds further complexity to the acculturation framework.
presented in our previous discussion and in Figure 1 above. We overlay this additional dimension in an effort to increase the explanatory power of Berry’s (1984, 2006a; Berry et al., 1987) model.

Figure 2 illustrates our proposed model of acculturation for the Japanese context. In understanding a society’s acculturation strategy, Berry’s (1984, 2006a; Berry et al., 1987) model essentially asked the following questions:

1) “To what degree should the majority have interactions with minority groups?” and
2) “To what degree should minorities maintain their cultural identities?”

However, the Japanese experience teaches us that an additional question should be asked to further ascertain whether or not individuals will experience successful acculturation in society. That question is simply:

3) “To what degree are minorities considered to be a part of society?”

The dimension reflected by this third question is represented in the upper portion of Figure 2 via the dotted outlined oval. In the traditional model of acculturation, it is quite clear that segregation and exclusion treat minority groups as outsiders. However, this adjusted model of acculturation additionally suggests that there may be two forms of both multiculturalism (integration) and the melting pot (assimilation)—one in which minorities are still considered to be outsiders and one in which minorities are considered to be part of society. The policies and research we have reviewed thus far suggest that the predominant view in Japan is of the former. Individuals who fulfill all assimilation “requirements” as defined in acculturation theory (e.g., Zainichi Koreans with native-level language fluency, who undergo naturalization and adoption of a Japanese name) are still identified as outsiders or non-Japanese. Similarly, individuals who are able to maintain their unique cultural identities while achieving high levels of interaction with the racioethnic Japanese majority (e.g., Westerners with Japanese culture/language fluency; who are hired into “regular” employment at organizations to obtain expertise on foreign markets, affairs, technologies, etc.; and who may even obtain Japanese citizenship) are also still viewed as outsiders or non-Japanese. A key barrier to the successful acculturation of minority groups therefore seems to be the persistence of this ingroup-outgroup distinction in Japanese society.
A number of recommendations may be made to alleviate this tendency for ingroup-outgroup categorization and to promote multiculturalism over other less effective forms of acculturation. Recommendations such as those put forth by the UN CERD (2010) for stronger anti-discrimination laws would certainly help to counter the tendency to make such categorizations and to promote mutual respect among majority and minority groups in society. Additionally, government programs might show greater acceptance toward minority groups by encouraging them to develop themselves as individuals with unique talents toward the betterment of Japan, rather than to narrowly develop a “Japanese identity” (cf. Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2011; Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2011). Furthermore, an open-minded discussion of citizenship and naturalization is necessary in order to address issues of identity preservation. Several questions come to mind on this issue. Can individuals in Japan—majority and minority group members alike—obtain an understanding of nationality as separate and distinct from racioethnicity, as is the case in many other countries, including the U.S., Canada, and Singapore? Would allowing individuals to have dual citizenship help them to take steps toward integration? Finally, a key way to simultaneously address this issue and promote multiculturalism would be through the development of education and training programs in multiculturalism for Japanese. Individuals may be coached to develop intercultural sensitivity (Bennett, 1993) or cultural intelligence (Earley & Ang, 2003) that may be applied in contexts both international and domestic.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have admittedly only scratched the surface in exploring the challenges that Japan faces in its efforts toward multiculturalism. An inaccurate understanding of Japan’s rich diversity, confusion about the basic principles of acculturation and multiculturalism, and persistence of ingroup-outgroup categorizations are only a few such challenges. It is our hope that others will not only join in the important work of addressing these points, but that they will also continue to identify and address other obstacles, so that we are able to see a multicultural and prosperous Japan.

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