The Hundred-Year Marathon: Michael Pillsbury's Warnings to Japan

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Dr. Michael Pillsbury, the author of the book, *The Hundred-Year Marathon*,[1] reveals at length how the past eight United States presidents, from Richard Nixon through Barack Obama, had carried out, as a matter of policy, a series of initiatives to strengthen China against its adversaries. For more than 40 years, the United States has helped China to build the world's No. 2 economy and develop its scientific and military capabilities in pursuit of the "Chinese Dream" in the realization of the "great renewal of the Chinese nation," to use Xi Jinping's pet phrase.[2]

Dr. Pillsbury "was among the first people to provide intelligence to the White House favoring an overture to China, in 1969."[3] Since then, for decades, he "played a sometimes prominent role in urging administrations of both parties to provide China with technological and military assistance."[4] As he acknowledges, "as a China expert who has worked in the Congress and in the executive branch for every administration since Richard Nixon's, [he has] arguably had more access to China's military and intelligence establishment than any other Westerner."[5] For such an expert to confess that he has failed to detect the Chinese hidden strategy of world dominance and has been misled and deceived by the Chinese counterpart is an extraordinary admission.

I

According to Pillsbury, for the past 40 years, the Chinese hawks through the leadership of Beijing, manipulated American policy makers to obtain intelligence and military, technological, and economic assistance. The source of that project is what the Chinese hawks instilled in the minds of all the leaders since Mao Zedong a plan that became known as "the Hundred-Year Marathon"[6] in order "to avenge a century of humiliation" and "to replace the United States as the economic, military and political leader of the world by the year 2049 (the one hundredth anniversary of the Communist Revolution)."[7] That is the title of the book.

U.S. assistance to the development of China was not limited to innocuous "cultural exchanges" in academia, but it purposefully focused on military know-how and engineering. It provided China with "major weapons systems" to strengthen its "army, navy, and air force, and even to help China to expand its marine corps."[8] It also extended to "genetic engineering, intelligent robotics, artificial intelligence, automation, biotechnology, lasers, supercomputers, space technology, and manned spaceflight."[9] Behind such expanding aid programs for China in the past decades, notes Pillsbury, are "American business leaders eager to maintain their growing relationships and business opportunities, as China almost certainly promised to be the largest emerging market in the world."[10] The same expectations were behind the Open Door Policy for China in the 19th century just like Europeans today who have flocked to the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

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1 Michael Pillsbury, *The Hundred Year Marathon* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015)
2 Xi Jinping, "Chinese Dream;" *available at* <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/chinesedream/>
3 P. 6.
4 *Ibid.*
5 P. 14.
6 P. 28.
7 P. 12.
8 P. 78.
9 *Ibid.*
10 P. 90.

The book is far from the author's exposé of Chinese state secrets; rather, it is the review of US relations with China on the basis of the author's awaken awareness that the Chinese hawks' assertion is "the mainstream of Chinese geopolitical thought."[11] As the author acknowledges, the book took 50 years in the making through his career of research and intelligence analysis including rare opportunities of discussions and exchanges of views with 34 Chinese "scholar generals."[12] Nevertheless, it must be remembered that, as the author noted, "None ever violated his or her oath to protect national secrets and uphold the Party line"[13] and there is no new disclosure of information or new exposé. Needless to say, as stated at the outset in the form of Author's Note, "The CIA, the FBI, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and an agency of the Defense Department reviewed this book prior to publication to ensure that there was no disclosure of classified information."[14]

What is astonishing about the book is that American experts in China or those government bureaucrats and politicians dealing closely with Chinese affairs have misread Chinese foreign policy. Even on President Nixon's visit to Beijing that was the beginning of US-China *rapprochement*, they were wrong: "Nixon did not first reach out to China; instead, China, in the person of Mao, first reached out to Nixon. Americans just didn't realize it;"[15] "the administration soon made numerous offers of covert military assistance to China---all based on false assumption that it was building a permanent cooperative relationship with China . . . ;"[16] and so, since "the China supporters in the Bush administration put the best possible spin on events,"[17] "[n]o one I worked with at the CIA or the Pentagon in the 1980s raised the idea that China could deceive the United States or be the cause of a major intelligence failure."[18] Despite unfavorable and disadvantageous events taking place against the interest of the US, "even these revelations did little to shake our complacency and optimism about China"[19] and "[m]ost American officials ignored the anti-American signs altogether"[20] and even when they were aware of the instruction not to translate anti-American commentaries, the author admits that "I was still not a China skeptic. Many channels of intelligence seemed to prove that this was all a passing phase."[21]

II

Why does the United States tend to take a persistent denial mode of thinking when it comes to dealing with China in the face of objective evidence disadvantageous to its own interest? The author explains "[m]any of us who study China have been taught to view the country as a helpless victim of Western imperialists—a notion that China's leaders not only believe, but also actively encourage."[22] "This perspective—the desire to help China at all costs, the almost willful blindness to any actions that undercut our views of Chinese goodwill and victimhood—has colored the U.S. government's approach to dealing with China."[23] Such perspective is deeply grounded in numerous stories told by Christian missionaries in China as reflected in Pearl S. Buck's *The Good Earth* (1931).[24] The United States was the most generous and tolerant to China than any other countries, and such basic attitude has remained the same today. As John van Antwerp MacMurray attested at length in his "1935 Memorandum on Developments Affecting American Policy in the Far East,"[25] the United States, having few realistic interests in China, tended to trust China's potentials and preferred to adopt a rather idealistic policy. The same attitude is evident throughout the book. George F. Kennan attributes it to "a certain sentimentality toward the Chinese—a sentimentality as disrespectful to them and as unhelpful to the long-term interests of

11 P. 15.
12 P. 303.
13 *Ibid.*
14 P. xi
15 P. 56.
16 P. 60.
17 P. 95.
18 P. 85.
19 P. 96.
20 *Ibid.*
21 P. 97.
22 P. 5.
23 *Ibid.*
24 A paperback edition is available at Washington Square Press, New York (1958).
25 It is included in *How the Peace Was Lost* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992) edited by Arthur Waldron with an introduction and notes.

our relations as the feelings of blind petulance into which it now has a tendency to turn."[26] For Japan, on the other hand, China was a country indispensable to it economically as well as politically, and the situation has not changed today. That gap or difference in their respective interests toward China between the United States and Japan has produced totally different policy toward China.

Historically, US-Japan relations have been constantly affected and troubled by the developments of US-China relations. The common denominator in trilateral relations among the United States, China and Japan is the United States. The competing relations between the US-Japan relationship and the US-China relationship bifurcate with the United States as a pivot. Even though China and Japan share the United States as a common pivot, the obvious difference in interests exists in their respective policies toward China between the United States and Japan. That difference creates an irregular triangle, and the bottom side of this triangle represents the Sino-Japan relationship, reflecting the competing interests of the US-Japan relationship on the one hand and the US-China relationship on the other. And behind the US-China relationship are, of course, American business leaders interested in China trade from the days of the American clipper ships of the 19th century.

Professor Arthur Waldron who edited Mr. MacMurray's 1935 Memorandum in the form of *How the Peace Was Lost*[27] made an interesting observation on the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1923 in the course of the Washington Conference of 1921-22. He says it is more accurate to ascribe the abrogation of the alliance to not so much Britain's Asian policy as Britain's policy toward the United States. For the sake of mental exercise, let us convert Professor Waldron's analysis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the US-Japanese Alliance. We will be able to see the problems Japan faces today more clearly.

For China the US-Japan Alliance is a thorn in China's side, and China is trying to drive a wedge in the US-Japan relationship and working very hard in suggesting, more than once, the United States recognize China's new major power relationship with the United States. Whether the United States changes its perception of its relations with China will depend on when the United States will consider it more profitable and advantageous for the United States to shake hands with China just like Nixon's sudden decision to visit China in 1971. What it means is that the termination of the US-Japan Security Treaty would be effected by not so much the United States' Asian policy as its policy toward China.

The importance of China has increased enormously not merely as a vast market, but as "the world factory" that drives the world economy, and so has the importance of China as an increasingly growing military power at a colossal rate. The United States needs China as the world No. 2 economy for its own economic prosperity. The growing military power capable of challenging the United States presence in the western Pacific Ocean prompts the United States to deepen its understanding of China as a major military power and to develop the mutually acceptable "code of conduct" with China. Since 2014 the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has been invited by the United States to participate in its largest naval exercise Rimpac.[28]

If we peruse a series of events surrounding the USS *Lassen's* so-called freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) of October 27, 2015,[29] we would appreciate the extent of US-China coordination and cooperation: (1) pronouncements and leaks made by U.S. officials of the planned "freedom of navigation" operations well in advance; (2) radio communications to the PLA Navy that the *Lassen's* operations were not harmful nor discriminatory to China;[30] (3) a video conference on October 29 between top U.S. and China naval officers (Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. John Richardson and Commander of the PLA

26 George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy,* Expanded Edition, 1984, p. 53.

27 *See supra* note 25.

28 "China joins RIMPAC naval exercise for the first time," Jul. 2, 2014, *Global Times;* available at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/daily-specials/china-rimpac-2014/>

29 Sam LaGore, "U.S. Destroyer Comes Within 12 Nautical Miles of Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island, Beijing Threatens Response," Oct. 27, 2015, USNI News; *available at* <http://news.usni.org/2015/10/27/u-s-destroyer-comes-within-12-nautical-miles-of-chinese-south-china-sea-artificial-island-beijing-threatens-response> and *see* Christopher P. Cavas, "Navy Chiefs Talk, New Details On Destroyer's Passage," Oct. 31, 2015, *DefenseNews; available at* <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/10/31/navy-china-richardson-wu-destroyer-lassen-south-china-sea-innocent-passage/74881704/>

30 Yeganeh Torbati, "Despite agreements, risks linger of U.S.-China naval mishaps," Oct. 30, 2015, *Reuters; available at* <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-communications-idUSKCN0SO0E220151030>

Navy, Adm. Wu Shengli);[31] (4) Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris's visit to Beijing on November 2;[32] and (5) the first U.S.-China joint naval exercise in the Atlantic Ocean on November 7; (6) the USS *Stethem's* visit to Shanghai on November 16;[33] and, may I add, (7) the White House's instructions to Defense officials to be quiet about the *Lassen's* FONOP.[34]

They all give the impression that the *Lassen's* FONOP was scripted, choreographed and well-staged in the name of "freedom of navigation."[35] So much so, immediately after the USS *Lassen's* FONOP in the South China Sea, the United States conducted, as if nothing had happened, the first U.S.-China joint naval exercise in the Atlantic Ocean on November 7, 2015.[36] There is no question that different perceptions about China are developing between the United States and Japan.

III

With these sobering revelations about the U.S.-China relations and the presence of Xi Jinping in the helm today as the aggressive promotor of the "Chinese Dream," we need to examine the implications of the different interests at stake between the United States and Japan toward China. A series of recent events relating to the freedom of navigation operations by the United States Navy in the waters around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea has allowed us to catch a glimpse of the future of the US-China relationship. Therein lies the warning of Dr. Pillsbury to Japan.

The so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) by the USS *Lassen* within 12 nautical miles of an artificial island built on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands on October 27, 2015 was abundantly commented on and analyzed by many articles in *The Diplomat*.[37] There is no need to recap the analysis here except to re-confirm that the *Lassen* chose not to "fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows," as Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced.[38] It demonstrated by deed its *respect* for the territorial boundary of sea and air space of the Subi Reef artificial island. Such a conclusion is further reinforced by the Pentagon's explanation that a B-52 bomber's flight on December 10, 2015 within two nautical miles of Cuarteron Reef in the Spratly Islands was "unintentional." That is, the B-52 bomber did not plan to fly to within 12 nautical miles, and according to the Wall Street *Journal*, bad weather had contributed to the pilot flying off course and into the area claimed by China.[39] Who would believe such explanation? The B-52 denied its own freedom of flight over the high seas, as recognized by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law.[40] The Pentagon did not maintain that it exercised its lawful right under international law. Rather, as consistently demonstrated above, the U.S. Navy and Air Force recognize the territorial sea as well as space claimed by China in the Spratly Islands, if not the South China Sea.

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31 Christopher P. Cavas, "US, Chinese Naval Chiefs To Talk," Oct. 28, 2015, *Defense News; available at* <http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/10/28/chief-of-naval-operations-admiral-john-richardson-wu-shengli-china-plan-navy-warships-ship-lassen-south-china-sea-spratly-artificial-islands/74747200/>

32 Associated Press, "US Pacific commander says sailing by Chinese islands was not a military threat," Nov. 3, 2015, *The Guardian; available at* <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/03/us-pacific-commander-says-sailing-by-chinese-islands-was-not-a-military-threat>

33 "U.S. Navy destroyer Stethem visits Shanghai," Nov. 17, 2015, China Military News; *available at* <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-11/17/content_6773547.htm> The visit was followed by the China-U.S. joint naval exercise in the South China sea. *See* Franz-Stefan Gady, "China and US Hold Joint Naval Exercise," Nov. 18, 2015, *The Diplomat; available at* <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/china-and-us-hold-joint-naval-exercise/n>

34 Helene Cooper & Jane Perlez, "White House Moves to Reassure Allies With South China Sea Patrol, but Quietly," Oct. 27, 2015, N.Y. Times; *available at* <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/world/asia/south-china-sea-uss-lassen-spratly-islands.html?_r=3>

35 See Mira Rapp-Hooper, "Make No Mistake--- The United States Should Get Its Message Straight in the South China Sea," Nov. 25, 2015, *Foreign Affairs; available at* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-11-25/make-no-mistake>

36 Chinese, U.S. navies conduct first joint drill in Atlantic, Nov. 9, 2015, *Defense News; available at* <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-11/09/content_4627988.htm>

37 Ankit Panda, "Everything You Wanted to Know About the USS *Lassen's* FONOP in the South China Sea," Jan. 6, 2016, *The Diplomat; available at* <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-the-uss-lassens-fonop-in-the-south-china-sea/>

38 "Carter says U.S. will sail, fly and operate wherever international law allows," Oct. 13, 2015, Reuters; *available at* <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-australia-southchinasea-carter-idUSKCN0S72MG20151013>

39 Jeremy Page & Gordon Lubold, "U.S. Bomber Flies Over Waters Claimed by China," Dec. 18, 2015, Wall Street *Journal ; available at* <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-jet-flies-over-waters-claimed-by-china-1450466358>

40 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part VII, Section 1, Article 87.1(b); *available at* <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>

IV

With the airport on Subi Reef completed, U.S. policy of being neutral to territorial and maritime disputes has allowed the rule of naked power to prevail. As China increases its A2/AD capabilities,[41] these airports constructed on a few atolls and shoals in the strategic points in the South China Sea will compensate for the absence of an aircraft carrier large enough to accommodate heavy and large aircraft, and it may not be so far away for the East China Sea and the South China Sea to be effectively controlled by China.[42] The United States seems to have accepted that reality. Unlike the USS *Lassen's* FONOP last year, when the USS *Curtis Wilbur*, a guided missile destroyer, sailed within 12 nautical miles of a disputed island in the South China Sea on January 30, 2016, Pentagon spokesman Jeff Davis formerly announced that it made the "innocent passage" off Triton Island in the Paracel Island chain, which is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam.[43]

It is significant that the Pentagon acknowledges that it conducted the "innocent passage" because the notion of "innocent passage" exists only in the territorial waters of the coastal state.[44] Which means the Pentagon acknowledges that the waters around Triton Island are the *territorial waters* of that coastal state. Although the Pentagon official claimed that the operation was conducted "to challenge excessive maritime claims of parties that claim the Paracel Islands,"[45] the conduct of "innocent passage" does not challenge the lawful authority of the coastal state. International law does not require prior notification to enter the territorial sea under the innocent passage regime.[46]

The apparent discordance among ASEAN member governments on the manner of settlement of South China Sea disputes indicates not only the presence of competing and crisscrossing interests among ASEAN member countries,[47] but also an undeniable Chinese influence. China uses its most preferred mode of "bi-lateral negotiations" between the two parties directly concerned with the issue at stake, rejecting the involvement of any outside parties just like its refusal to participate in the international arbitration case filed by the Philippines.[48] China thus deals with one country at a time from the position of strength. All countries want to benefit from China's riches. China's Renminbi will become an international currency as one of the IMF's SDR basket currencies on October 1, 2016.[49] The world should welcome the internationalization of the Renminbi as a source of global liquidity. But China pursues policy of outward expansion with impunity in defiance of international norms and practice.[50]

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41 See Christopher J. McCarthy, "Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare;" *available at* <https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=95> and Andrew Krepinevich *et al.*, "Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2003); *available at* <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2003/05/a2as-anti-access-area-denial/>

42 Eisuke Suzuki, "The Post-War International Order with Chinese Characteristics and the "Enemy State" Clauses of the United Nations Charter," *Journal of Policy Studies*, No. 49, Mar. 2015 (Kwansei Gakuin University Policy Studies Association), at 23, 34-39.

43 "US warship sails by island claimed by China: Pentagon," Jan. 30, 2016, *AFP; available at* <http://news.yahoo.com/us-warship-sailed-waters-off-island-claimed-china-005832507.html>

44 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II, Section 3, Articles 17 & 18; *available at* <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>

45 A remark of the Pentagon spokesman, referred to at *supra* note 43.

46 The question of the notification requirement was settled by the two most powerful naval countries of the Cold War, the USA and USSR, through the issuance in 1989 of a *Joint Statement on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage*, which provided as follows:

> "All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament, or means of propulsion enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is required."

Quoted in Simon O. Williams, "Maritime Security: The Concept of Innocent Passage," Nov. 9, 2015, the Maritime Executive; *available at* <http://www.maritime-executive.com/features/Maritime-Security-Private-The-Concept-of-Innocent-Passage>

47 Yeganeh Torbati & Trinna Leong, "ASEAN defense chiefs fail to agree on South China Sea statement," Nov. 4, 2015; *available at* <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-malaysia-statement-idUSKCN0ST07G20151104>

48 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on 4 June 2014; *available at* <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1162256.shtml> and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines," 7 Dec. 2014, at 30: China has always insisted that disputes should be "peacefully resolved theough negotiations between the countries directly concerned;" *available at* <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/ yzs_663350/xwlb_663352/t1217147.shtml>

49 IMF, "Chinese Renminbi to be Identified in the IMF's Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves," Press Release No. 16/90, Mar. 4, 2016; *available at* <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr1690.htm>

50 *See* Stefan Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century* (New York:Basic Books, 2010).

The more the Renminbi is used as an international settlement currency, the more it will be considered China's challenge to the Bretton Woods system. The grandiose vision of "The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" or otherwise known as "the Belt and Road Initiative"[51] is designed to create a vast economic zone embracing a new Eurasian economic belt in the north and a new maritime route in the south starting from the eastern seaboard of China through the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Middle Eastern and East African countries to the EU. It is the wing that will lift the development of "the Renminbi Financial Zone." The AIIB is a vehicle to realize that Chinese dream.[52] What China aims at would be the establishment of China-centric world order with the renewal of its global tributary system.

It cannot be denied that the funding source of China's military expansion is the growing supply of the Renminbi. With the internationalization of the Chinese currency together with the opening of the Euro-Renminbi market in the City, London, under the auspices of the U.K. government, China will be in a more advantageous position to print more Renminbi bills at will and its military power will expand correspondingly. As Pillsbury remarked on the basis of the RAND Corporation's study, "From now through 2030, the Chinese will have more than $1 trillion available to spend on new weapons for their navy and air force"[53]. "This," concludes Pillsbury, "paints a picture of near parity, if not outright Chinese superiority, by mid-century. The future military balance of power is slowly shifting, from a ten-to-one U.S. superiority, toward equality, and then eventually to Chinese superiority."[54] Before that happens, I suspect influential American business leaders, who are major donors to presidential campaigns and "eager to maintain their growing relationships and business opportunities" in China, will lobby the administration to promote and protect their vast business and commercial opportunities "as China almost certainly promise[s] to be the largest emerging market in the world."[55] New support will be no doubt "mobilized in Congress, based on constituents' economic interests."[56] Sooner or later, the United States would make a move to protect its own interest by providing America's goodwill and assistance to China as usual because of "a certain sentimentality toward the Chinese" as George Kennan pointed out long ago.[57]

We have to be prepared for that eventuality, so that we would not repeat the same fate of being dumbfounded at the United States' *rapprochement* with the Communist China in 1971. The so-called Nixon Shock and its resultant humiliation, sorrow, disappointment, and anger at being bypassed by the United States, with which we thought we had a special relationship, taught us a lesson. To maintain the close relationship with the United States cannot be the sole purpose and objective of Japan's foreign policy, but a means to safeguard Japan's interest. Kei Wakaizumi, who was a covert go-between and negotiator as Prime Minister Eisuke Sato's personal representative in negotiations between the United States and Japan on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan from 1968 to 1974, offered his last advice before he took his life in 1996 as follows:

> Relations between countries are naturally never static or permanent and differ from the ties that exist between individuals. A thorough and comprehensive reassessment of the amicable and cooperative bilateral relationship, centered as it has been since the war on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is inevitable. Such a review will necessarily lead to a redefinition of the relationship based on the long-term, fundamental goals and ideologies of

51 See Tian Shaohui (ed.), "Chronology of China's Belt and Road Initiative," Xinhuanet, Mar. 28, 2015; *available at* <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm>

52 President Xi Jinping's remarks at the Asian-African Summit held on April 22-23, 2015 in Jakarta, Indonesia: "China will, together with other parties concerned, promote the construction of the "Belt and Road", earnestly build the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and bring the role of the Silk Road Fund into full play. China will continue to facilitate the South-South cooperation and South-North cooperation, so as to jointly safeguard peace and stability in the region as well as the world and promote common development and prosperity." <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdbjstjxgsfwbfydnxycxyfldrhyhwlhy60znjnhd/t1258694.shtml>

53 P. 141.

54 *Ibid.*

55 P. 90.

56 *Id.* at 91.

57 George F. Kennan attributes it to "a certain sentimentality toward the Chinese—a sentimentality as disrespectful to them and as unhelpful to the long-term interests of our relations as the feelings of blind petulance into which it now has a tendency to turn." *American Diplomacy,* Expanded Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 53.

> the two countries and will require that the Japanese people (in the interests of Asia and the rest of the world, as well as America) begin to clearly and confidently articulate, in universal terms, Japan's ideals and national interests.[58]

We have to prepare ourselves for the inevitable U.S. acceptance of China's offer of "major-country relationship with the United States,"[59] which President Xi Jinping has been seeking. It is an open secret that China considers the Pacific Ocean large enough to accommodate the United States and China, the former controlling the eastern half of the Pacific Ocean and the latter controlling the western half of the Ocean. Such scenario has already been played out by none other than *Foreign Policy* magazine's simulation exercise over the Senkaku Islands:[60] "the last thing in the world we want is to start a shooting war with the world's only other super power over a bunch of worthless rocks."[61] What is in effect projected is, I would suspect, the U.S.-China condominium of the Pacific Ocean, and the *Lassen's* innocent passage was a prelude to the shaking hands of the United States with China, allowing China effective control of not only the East China Sea alone, but also the western Pacific Ocean. And that is the warning given by Dr. Pillsbury to Japan. ###

58 Wakaizumi, Kei,The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), at 25.

59 President Xi Jinping's speech at "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" Anniversary," 8 June 2014; *available at* <https://www.google.co.uk/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=nX66U63qFIvR8geiz4HoBQ&gws_rd=ssl#q=xi+jinping's+remarks+on+Five+Principles+for+Peaceful+COEXISTENCE&spell=1>

60 Dan de Luce & Keith Johnson, "How FP Stumbled Into a War With China---and Lost," Jan. 15, 2016, *Foreign Policy ; available at* <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/15/how-fp-stumbled-into-a-war-with-china-and-lost/> ..

61 *Ibid*.

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